Solving the principal - agent problem in Iraq: economic incentives create a new model for security by Cole, Verlan R. et al.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2007-12
Solving the principal - agent problem in
Iraq: economic incentives create a new
model for security
Cole, Verlan R.










MBA PROFESSIONAL REPORT 
 
 
Solving the Principal – Agent Problem in Iraq: 





By:    Verlan R. Cole 
  Jayson L. Cramer, and  
  L. Scott Hollingsworth 
December 2007 
 
Advisors: Francois Melese, 






Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 i
 REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, 
searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send 
comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to 
Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 
22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE  
December 2007 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
MBA Professional Report 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Solving the Principal-Agent Problem in Iraq: 
Economic Incentives Create a New Model for Security 
6. AUTHOR(S) Verlan R. Cole, Jayson L. Cramer, and L. Scott Hollingsworth 
 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER   
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
  AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy 
or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT  
Approved For Public Release; Distribution Is Unlimited. 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
 
This report evaluates several alternatives that could be used to form a public policy in Iraq for sharing oil 
revenues with the Iraqi people. Using the Alaska Permanent Fund dividend as a potential model for Iraq, two key 
criteria were formulated for comparison and contrast with other alternatives currently available to the Iraqi 
government. The evaluative criteria were: does the model distribute wealth to the people and does it encourage 
increased security and stability to protect that means of wealth distribution. The results of a cost-benefit analysis 







15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
133 
14. SUBJECT TERMS Oil revenue distribution, Iraq stabilization and reconstruction, Alaska 
Permanent Fund Dividend, privatization  

















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  
 Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 
 ii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 iii
Approved For Public Release; Distribution Is Unlimited. 
 
 
SOLVING THE PRINCIPAL–AGENT PROBLEM IN IRAQ: 
ECONOMIC INCENTIVES CREATE A NEW MODEL FOR 
SECURITY 
 
Verlan R. Cole, Captain, United States Air Force 
Jayson L. Cramer, Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy 
L. Scott Hollingsworth, First Lieutenant, United States Air Force 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
 
 










Authors:  _____________________________________ 
Verlan R. Cole 
 
   _____________________________________ 
Jayson L. Cramer 
 
   _____________________________________ 
   L. Scott Hollingsworth 
 
Approved by:  _____________________________________ 
Francois Melese, Co-Advisor 
 
   _____________________________________ 
   Alan J. Laverson, Co-Advisor 
 
   _____________________________________ 
   Robert N. Beck, Dean 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy 
 iv
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 v
SOLVING THE PRINCIPAL–AGENT PROBLEM IN IRAQ: 







This paper offers a path for Iraqis to provide for their own security by ensuring 
each Iraqi citizen has a stake in Iraq’s oil wealth. The hypothesis is that private, 
individual oil ownership provides dual incentives. First, each Iraqi citizen would have an 
interest in contributing to the security of Iraq’s oil infrastructure and in monitoring the 
quality of investments, since they and their family would directly benefit. Second, if each 
Iraqi had the ability to convert some of their stake in Iraq’s nonrenewable oil resources 
into renewable financial capital, then they would make entrepreneurial investments that 
could help diversify Iraq’s economy and contribute to economic development. This report 
evaluates several alternatives that might be offered for consideration by Iraqi policy 
makers to distribute Iraq’s oil wealth directly to the Iraqi people. The Alaska Permanent 
Fund dividend offers one potential model for Iraq. Other models explored in this study 
include the experience of Chad and various privatizations that took place in Eastern 
Europe. The advantages and disadvantages of alternative oil distribution schemes are 
explored in an effort to offer new insights and opportunities to policy makers. Several 
criteria were developed to evaluate the proposed alternatives. These criteria were an 
outgrowth of three main questions asked of each alternative: First, how efficiently would 
the model distribute oil ownership to the Iraqi people? Second, how effective is it likely 
to be in encouraging individuals to support increased security and stability? And finally, 
how effective is it likely to be in contributing to future economic development?  
 vi
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This project has one primary goal: to investigate how to create a direct financial 
interest on the part of individual Iraqis to invest in their country’s stability and 
reconstruction. The thesis explores the benefits and costs of alternative approaches that 
would guarantee private individual Iraqi ownership of that nation’s oil wealth.  
The study has two underlying hypotheses: First, through private ownership, 
individual Iraqis will have an incentive to preserve the value of their shares, resulting in a 
strong financial interest and demand for stability. Second, by allowing every Iraqi the 
ability to sell some or all of their shares, and/or to receive dividends from an oil fund, 
financing will be made available for entrepreneurial efforts that will help spur 
reconstruction. Given an adequate macroeconomic and institutional environment, the 
incentives derived from oil ownership could have the effect of stimulating the Iraqi 
economy unleashing the entrepreneurial spirit of the Iraqi people, boosting economic 
development, and creating even greater demand for stability by individual Iraqi citizens. 
Furthermore, by allowing the accumulation of shares, powerful ownership interests will 
arise that will insist on the protection and efficient management and operation of Iraq’s 
oil infrastructure. The objective of this project is to identify and examine alternative ways 
to allocate oil ownership in such a way as to boost security and avoid the dreaded 
“resource curse.” (Looney, 2006a) 
The thesis begins with a review of the literature that provides important 
background information on key issues that face Iraq. Next, a thorough examination and 
analysis is provided of current challenges confronting the government of Iraq. This is 
followed by a description of the underlying principal-agent problem that faces the U.S. in 
inspiring all Iraqi citizens to contribute to the stability and reconstruction of their country. 
In order to explore ways to incentivize and encourage Iraqis to do so, the next section 
examines alternative methods of distributing a nation’s wealth to its population. The 
privatization experiences of both Czechoslovakia and Poland are briefly described. These 
examples present two alternative approaches that could be useful if Iraq decided to 
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undertake similar measures. Along with a discussion of the distribution of oil revenues in 
Norway and Chad, Alaska’s Permanent Oil Fund mechanism is introduced as a possible 
model for Iraq. A description of the fundamental components of these alternative wealth 
distribution models serves as the basis for a qualitative cost-benefit analysis.  
Several criteria were developed to evaluate the proposed alternatives. These 
criteria were an outgrowth of three main questions asked of each alternative distribution 
model: First, how equitably would the model distribute oil ownership to the Iraqi people? 
Second, how effective is it likely to be in encouraging individuals to support increased 
security and stability? And finally, how effective is it likely to be in contributing to future 
economic development? The results of the cost-benefit analysis are used to evaluate 
alternative oil distribution proposals and to support several policy recommendations. 
These recommendations are aimed at ensuring individual Iraqis have an interest in a 
stable and secure society by giving them a personal stake in the successful development 
of their economy.  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. IRAQ’S ECONOMY AND INFRASTRUCTURE 
Iraq’s prewar economy was partly socialist (centralized ownership and control) 
and partly private. The private sector of the economy was informal and was characterized 
by subsistence farming, barter, and some forms of self-employment. The socialist side 
was made up of nationalized industries and a large public workforce responsible for the 
operation and control of those industries. 
More than 60 percent of the population depended on national food rationing 
programs for survival. Iraq’s economy was decimated by its eight-year war with Iran and 
twelve years of United Nations (UN) sanctions imposed after the first Gulf War in 1991. 
Rapid inflation occurred because Saddam Hussein continued to print money to fund 
national programs. Iraq’s infrastructure deteriorated as a result of being ravaged by years 
of war and neglect. Human capital, along with the physical infrastructure, stagnated as 
money for education and literacy programs evaporated. (Foote et al., 2004) 
Corruption and violence have had disastrous effects on Iraq’s economy both 
before and after the second Gulf War in 2003. The Oil for Food Program reduced 
investment incentives in the private sector, especially in agriculture. The program led to 
increasingly centralized control and became a vehicle for widespread corruption by many 
government officials. Since the end of the second Gulf War, street crime has also become 
a major obstacle to overcome for private sector investment. (Brown, 2005) 
For long-term reconstruction to be achieved in Iraq, an environment of economic 
and political stability must be created. The people of Iraq must be able to live their lives 
in a secure and peaceful environment. According to Looney (2006a), to reach that end 
state Iraq must make progress in several critical areas; they must quell the insurgency that 
exists throughout the country, they must build viable political institutions, and they must 
develop the ability to provide their own security.  
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Rebuilding Iraq’s economy is of paramount importance. Iraq’s current widespread 
unemployment and lack of essential services has fueled high levels of frustration among 
the population. The successful implementation of a market-based economy would help 
satisfy Iraqi’s basic needs and restore faith in a new Iraq. Promoting the private sector 
will not only make the people greater economic stakeholders, but would likely facilitate 
increased cooperation with government and security forces to root out suspected 
insurgents. (Looney, 2006a) 
The post World War II economy of Germany faced several similar problems. The 
substantial devaluation of the local currency and prolonged implementation of 
government subsidies contributed to the growth of a predominantly informal economy 
characterized by widespread shortages of consumer goods, rampant employee 
absenteeism, and barter as the primary method of trade. (Henderson, 2002) 
The answer to Germany’s problem was the brain child of an anti-Nazi, post-war 
politician, Ludwig Erhard. Erhard’s three pronged solution consisted of currency reform, 
elimination of price controls, and a reduction of marginal tax rates. Erhard’s solution was 
to substitute a much smaller number of new “Deutsche marks” for the previously utilized 
“Reich marks” and in the process the German money supply was reduced by 93 percent. 
This ensured that the new money had value and helped move economic transactions away 
from barter and back to the use of currency exchange. Following the reduction in money 
supply, Erhard launched a massive price decontrol program which virtually eliminated all 
government subsidies and paved the way for a free market economy. The result was “the 
reforms quickly reestablished money as the preferred medium of exchange and monetary 
incentives as the prime mover of economic activity" (Henderson, 2002). Soon after, 
shops began filling up with goods to sell and employee absenteeism dropped dramatically 
as people began to look for ways to earn currency and forego bartering and foraging. 
(Henderson, 2002) 
Historically, developing countries with abundant natural resources such as oil or 
diamonds have underperformed many resource deficient countries in growth of per capita 
gross domestic product. Nations such as Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Chad, Iraq, and Ecuador 
are all relevant examples of how a wealth of resources does not guarantee economic 
 5
prosperity for the population. The per capita GDP of Chad and Nigeria ranks at the 
bottom of all oil exporting nations in sub-Saharan Africa at $295/year and $447/year, 
respectively1 (IMF, 2007). In resource-abundant regions, political corruption and 
excessive military investment are common, whereas investments in education, healthcare, 
and other social programs are often neglected. As a result, the political environment that 
develops is more authoritarian and the people benefit little from their country’s natural 
wealth. (Looney, 2006a) 
According to Looney (2006a), 
Situations such as these tend to create internal instability and often lead to 
terrorist activity and/or civil war. Seventeen civil wars during the period of 
1990-2002 can be linked to a struggle for control of the nation’s natural 
resources (see Table 1). One way Iraq can avoid this “resource curse” is to 
distribute its vast oil wealth equitably among the population and to 
facilitate the development of a viable market-based economy. With 
sufficient distributed private sector ownership of resources and the 
concurrent entrepreneurial activity, Iraq’s economic growth would 
transform people into active shareholders instead of passive subjects of a 
government that controls the wealth. 
                                                 
1 Using 2007 exchange rates. 
 6
Table 1.   Civil Wars Linked To Resource Wealth (After Ross, 2003) 
 
Country  Duration  Resources  
Afghanistan  1978-2001  Gems, opium  
Angola  1975-2002  Oil, Diamonds  
Angola (Cabinda)  1975-  Oil  
Burma  1949-  Timber, tin, gems, opium 
Cambodia  1978-97  Timber, gems  
Colombia  1984-  Oil, gold, coca  
Congo, Rep.  1997  Oil  
Congo, Dem. Rep.  1996-97  Copper, coltan, 
diamonds, gold, cobalt  
Congo, Dem. Rep.  1998-  Copper, coltan, 
diamonds, gold, cobalt  
Indonesia (Aceh)  1975-  Natural gas, marijuana  
Indonesia (W Papua)  1969-  Copper, gold  
Liberia  1989-96  Timber, diamonds, iron, 
palm oil, cocoa, coffee, 
marijuana, rubber, gold  
Morocco  1975-  Phosphates, oil  
Papua New Guinea  1988-  Copper, gold  
Peru  1980-1995  Coca  
Sierra Leone  1991-2000  Diamonds  
Sudan  1983-  Oil  
 
Unfortunately, developing a free market system in Iraq is not easy. Under Saddam 
Hussein’s Baathist government, Iraq’s economic resources were nationalized and tightly 
controlled by the government. During his oppressive regime, an informal economy 
developed within the country. Since his ousting in 2003, it is believed that this informal 
economy has continued to grow and constitutes roughly 65 to 80 percent of Iraq’s current 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (Looney, 2006b).  
Iraq’s informal economy poses several significant problems that stymie the 
development of a efficient, market-based economy. First, the limited knowledge of the 
actual size of the informal economy impedes effective monetary policy and inflation 
controls. Second, the lack of transparency makes it difficult to understand the supply and 
demand of goods and services required to support the population. And third, informal 
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economies rife with criminal and black market activities can increase transaction costs, 
making exchanges less efficient. Add to this the uncertainty created by the insurgency 
and a corrupt political system currently ranked 129th out of 145 nations worldwide2 and 
the task of turning Iraq’s economy around is a tall order. (Looney, 2006b) 
Reconstruction of Iraq’s infrastructure was a primary objective following the 
coalition’s swift military victory in 2003. The assumption that peace would be restored 
once Iraq’s infrastructure was rebuilt led policy makers to pursue reconstruction for 
short-term aims vice sustainable long-term gains3. Much like Iraq’s economy, its 
infrastructure was in gross disrepair following years of government neglect coupled with 
the prolonged effects of international sanctions. Once in place, U.S. policy makers 
emphasized expediency and managed major projects along short timelines. (Brown, 
2005) 
The reconstruction management practices failed to include local participation of 
key Iraqi authorities and, therefore, failed to create credibility and a sense of ownership 
by the local population. The newly liberated populace voiced their frustrations over the 
lack of essential services with blame naturally shifting to coalition forces. With many of 
Iraq’s worst areas completely overlooked, they became easy recruiting grounds for militia 
groups that operate within the country. The growing insurgency and their strategic attacks 
on critical reconstruction targets have made rebuilding Iraq’s infrastructure significantly 
more costly and complex. Thus, the opportunity to use the reconstruction of Iraq’s 
infrastructure as the primary catalyst for peace largely failed. Instead, reconstruction 
efforts must be accompanied by economic and political reforms and a sense of ownership 
for peace to become a reality in Iraq. (Brown, 2005) 
                                                 
2 As ranked by the Transparency International Corporation. The criteria were not mentioned 
specifically in the study referenced by Looney, but this project assumed this to mean corruption on the part 
of public officials such as graft, theft of public resources, and the allowance of various crimes within the 
official halls of government. 
3 One example is not providing enough security for government ministry buildings. The U.S.’ aims 
were to decapitate the Saddam government, then leave security to others. This posed serious problems for 
the State Department’s Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance personnel in quickly 
resuming the business of civil affairs and governance. 
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B. PRIVATIZATION 
The transition from state owned-and-operated enterprise to private-sector 
ownership is commonly referred to as privatization (Park, 1998). Since Saddam 
Hussein’s removal from power, U.S. policymakers have envisioned the privatization of 
Iraq’s state-owned enterprises as a crucial step in Iraq’s resurgence in the international 
community. However, the transformation of a highly centralized economy into a free-
market economy involves a drastic reallocation of resources, inherent risks, and painful 
social ramifications.  
The two widely accepted approaches to facilitate the transition of state-owned 
enterprise to private sector ownership are commonly referred to as the Governmental, or 
“gradual approach,” and the market approach--also known as “Shock Therapy.” Both 
methods were employed, in varying degrees, throughout the former communist Eastern 
Bloc countries following the fall of the Soviet Union in 1989. (Park, 1998) 
A gradual approach takes into account the massive upheaval associated with the 
transition from one economic system to another. This approach attempts to avoid political 
and economic uncertainty by taking a more cautious and systematic course. Under this 
approach, the government performs basic restructuring of state-owned enterprises, 
determines their potential value, and offers them to potential investors. Unfortunately, 
this process is extremely time consuming and results in many less viable enterprises 
continuing to be funded by government subsidies.  
Subsidies for less efficient enterprises are used to offset the social costs of the loss 
of essential services and widespread unemployment. The advantages of this approach are 
less unemployment, less bankruptcy, and minimized social upheaval. The disadvantages 
include the difficulty of enterprise valuation, the requirement for prolonged political 
stability, the time required for enterprise restructuring, and the fact that the time needed 
for such an approach often makes it vulnerable to anti-privatization movements. (Park, 
1998) 
The alternative is a market approach that places ownership rights directly into the 
hands of the private sector as quickly as possible. This approach operates under the 
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assumption that market forces will efficiently allocate resources in a free-market 
environment, without the need for large-scale government intervention.  
Of the majority of Eastern Bloc countries that pursued this path, such as Romania, 
the Czech Republic, and Poland, free or minimal cost vouchers were issued to the public, 
who in turn used them to bid for shares of enterprises or exchanged them with an 
investment fund for a share of the fund. The advantages of the market approach are: there 
is little need for corporate restructuring by the government, no need for enterprise 
valuations, and there are strong entrepreneurial incentives. A disadvantage is that “shock 
therapy” can bankrupt inefficient enterprises and result in a significant amount of short-
term unemployment. It also requires strong financial markets and strong market 
institutions (i.e., the definition, protection, and enforcement of property rights and 
contract law). (Park, 1998) 
The transition of many Central and Eastern European nations to a market-based 
economy generated many lessons for other nations hoping to make similar changes. The 
primary lesson is that free market economies are not created solely by macroeconomic 
policy reform; they must be built upon strong institutional foundations that promote 
private enterprise and entrepreneurial activity.  
According to Behrman et al, 2000, an effective market economy requires 
institutions that perform six basic functions. First, institutions must promote innovation 
and productivity. These institutions must allow for economic motivation yet be able to 
restrain unethical activities. Second, regulations and laws must be enacted and enforced 
that minimize corruption, and encourage competition. “The rule of law is the basic 
institutional structure within which free societies function and competitive markets 
operate.” (Behrman et al, 2000) Third, private property rights must be protected. Fourth, 
the freedom to pursue enterprise must exist (e.g., low costs to launch a business). Fifth, 
the market must be able to operate with a minimum of government interference and 
decisions based on market outcomes must be made freely. Lastly, competition must be 
allowed to flourish.  
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C. IRAQI OIL MANAGEMENT 
Iraqi oil reserves make up 10% of all known global reserves (Vreedenburgh, 
2004). Proper management of this valuable resource is critical to the country’s future. 
Iraqi history indicates that when an unrepresentative government controls oil resources it 
can cause significant pain and suffering for its citizens. Therefore, the idea of distributing 
Iraq’s most significant natural asset among its people to promote stability and 
reconstruction has merit. The question lies in whether a representative Iraqi government 
should control the oil or whether it should be distributed directly to the people. The next 
question is whether oil extraction/production should be privatized, essentially turning 
operational control over to more efficient private oil companies under the direction and 
control of private Iraqi shareholders.  
Before a new plan for Iraqi oil management can be fully analyzed, pre-war 
contractual commitments must be addressed. Saddam Hussein left the country with a 
serious debt crisis. Several countries and corporations claim to have contracts for oil 
rights and claim that in order for any forthcoming plans to be legitimate, these old 
contracts must be resolved. The question of legitimacy is vital to the rebuilding effort and 
does not only involve honoring contracts, but will set the tone for a new government and 
the people of Iraq.  
In May 2003, the newly appointed leader of Iraq’s oil ministry vowed to review 
the legal and economic validity of all pre-war contracts in an attempt to dismiss many of 
them based on proving they were created only to benefit Saddam Hussein and that they 
were unfair to the Iraqi people. In the mean time, negotiations are being conducted in an 
attempt to settle these contracts and maintain legitimacy for possible future negotiations. 
The decision to honor or invalidate these contracts could take a good deal of time to 
resolve and could play a large role in the decision to privatize. (Vreedenburgh, 2004) 
In 2005, the newly elected leaders of Iraq constructed a constitution and adopted 
its use by referendum. This constitution directly states that, 
Oil and gas is the property of all the Iraqi people in all regions and 
provinces.” (Article 109) “The Federal Government will administer oil 
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and gas extracted from current fields in cooperation with the governments 
of the producing regions and provinces on condition that the revenues will 
be distributed fairly in a manner compatible with the demographic 
distribution all over the country. (Article 110) 
This clearly lays the groundwork for implementing revenue-sharing proposals. The 
problem is that much is left to interpretation and, based on who does the interpreting, it 
provides the opportunity for corruption.  
One plan that has been proposed, allegedly based on these articles, clearly favors 
northern Kurdish and southern Shi’a provinces (where there are many oil rich fields), 
while ignoring the central region of Iraq or Sunni population (where there are no oil 
fields). This may be the case intentionally since the Sunnis were part of the ruling elite 
when Saddam was in power, or simply because it is felt that revenues should benefit the 
areas where oil is extracted. Either way, it appears that this proposal does not satisfy the 
spirit intended in the constitution. (Kasaev, 2007) 
Although it is not getting much media attention, Iraqi oil continues to be extracted 
and sold. It is true that the oil fields have come under intense fire from insurgency forces; 
estimates suggest that $11.4 billion was lost due to these attacks. However, extraction has 
steadily increased from a low of 185,000 barrels per day to the current level of 2.06 
million barrels per day. In comparison, pre-war levels averaged 3 million barrels per day. 
(Kasaev, 2007) 
It is difficult to determine where the oil is going at this point but there are exports 
to Turkey, France, and possibly to several other countries. According to the head of the 
Cambridge Energy Research Association (CERA), “the system of foreign investments 
and the private sector in [Iraq’s] oil industry remains vague. In the absence of a clear-cut 
contractual system of investments, Iraq can export 30 to 40 percent less oil than before 
the war” (Kasaev, 2007). It is critical to work out the issues involved in this industry as 
soon as possible.  
Popularity is growing for a program that distributes revenues to citizens, as well 
as to the provinces. Such a program would give power to citizens in promoting economic 
growth, allow a sense of ownership in the new political process, reduce regional criticism 
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of the government due to increased transparency, and ensure fair distribution of funds. 
This program needs to be well defined with clear policies run by a responsible 
organization that is obliged to publish all transactions for review. It would need to be 
highly transparent and accountable in order to be trusted by the population and to 
minimize corruption.  
The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative has proposed “revenue 
transparency procedures” that could facilitate the program. Outside assistance, however, 
should only be provided if requested by the Iraqi people. No program will succeed if it is 
forced upon them by outsiders; therefore, it is imperative that they are given every 
opportunity to create their own system of distributing revenues. (Palley, 2004) One 
possible model is the Alaska Permanent (Oil) Fund. 
D. ALASKA PERMANENT FUND DIVIDEND 
Established by legislative action in 1976, the Alaska Permanent Fund (APF) sets 
aside a portion of oil revenues generated from the public ownership of the state’s natural 
resources, invests them in financial instruments, then distributes the cash dividends to the 
citizens of Alaska. Approximately 25 percent of all royalties and income earned are 
invested into a professionally managed fund which consists of various income-producing 
investments.  
Distributions from the APF are allocated equally among the 600,000 permanent 
residents of the state. Since its inception a little over 20 years ago, the principal portion of 
the APF has grown from a modest $137 million in 1979, past $1 billion by 1988, to its 
current value of $30 billion (Goldsmith, 2002). The fund’s principal is constitutionally 
protected, with withdrawals from the fund’s principal requiring a two-thirds vote by the 
legislature and a majority popular vote.  
The distributions to Alaska’s citizens are made from the income generated by the 
fund’s investments. Most recently, each citizen has received an annual stipend of 
approximately $1,000 during the past 5 years; this equates to about 6 percent of an 
average household’s annual income. (Goldsmith, 2002) 
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The primary objectives for the creation of the APF have been to acknowledge the 
inevitable depletion of Alaska’s oil resources and to keep politicians from squandering oil 
revenues on wasteful government projects. By converting natural oil resources into 
renewable financial ones, the revenue generated from these mineral resources will benefit 
current and future generations of Alaskans.  
The citizens’ mistrust of local politicians was exacerbated when the first $900 
million dollar payment received by the government from private oil companies for the 
initial lease of drilling rights seemed to have vanished overnight. Alaska’s then Governor 
Jay Hammond responded to the public outcry by championing the Permanent Dividend 
Fund legislation. (Anderson, 2002) 
Several factors have been vital to the fund’s success. A powerful constituency 
developed from the citizen’s sense of ownership. It was initially created as a response to 
curb wasteful spending. Investments in stocks and bonds insulated the fund from the local 
political arena. The fund is managed by a corporation focused on maximizing earnings 
and is independent from the state. State personal income taxes were eliminated and were 
replaced with an annual stipend for permanent residents. (Goldsmith, 2002) 
The APF has had numerous effects on Alaska’s economic, political, and social 
systems. One of the more dramatic economic effects is that the population of Alaska has 
one of the most equitable income distributions in the country. According to Goldsmith 
(2002), 
Data reported by the Economic Policy Institute [shows] that in the last 10 
years, the income of the poorest fifth of Alaska families increased 28 
percent, compared to a 7 percent increase for the richest fifth. In contrast, 
for the entire United States over the same period, the increase for the 
poorest fifth was 12 percent compared to 26 percent for the richest fifth. 
Politically, the fund has such a strong backing that any politician who suggests a 
reduction in benefits is committing “political suicide.” Socially, many of Alaska’s 
younger citizens have grown up only receiving money from the government vice paying 
taxes and do not appreciate the reasons for it. Moreover, it is feared that many Alaskans 
have become preoccupied with consumption and are failing to invest for the future. It is 
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thought that the APF has also had a drastic effect on population immigration into Alaska 
and has reduced natural emigration, as well. (Goldsmith, 2002) 
Developed out of political mistrust, the APF has become self-binding. First, the 
fund is heavily protected by the state constitution and is removed from political budget 
competition and pork-barrel legislation. Second, the trust is protected by its citizens and 
is revocable only if the entire electorate votes to abolish it. Third, the fund’s principal is 
protected from spending and is further bolstered by inflation-proofing methods. Fourth, 
the independent board of trustees and the APF Corporation’s pursuit of earnings, in 
contrast to any political agenda, create another level of protection. Lastly, and perhaps 
most importantly, the APF is protected by the fact that every Alaskan has become an 
active stakeholder in the program. (Anderson, 2002) 
On the surface, it would appear that the APF has been an economic success for 
the citizens of Alaska. But has it? Could the revenues generated have been better applied 
to social projects and programs?  
Alaska’s economy is highly reflective of many other resource-abundant 
economies throughout the world. A large majority of state revenues, approximately 85 
percent, is derived from oil, but the industry itself only employs a small fraction of the 
population. Alaska’s government revenue is substantially undiversified and its fortunes 
are heavily tied to the unpredictable fluctuations of the global market for crude oil. The 
heavy reliance on a single commodity as the primary source of government spending has 
subjected Alaska to periods of feast and famine.  
This boom and bust cycle has created financial instability within the Alaskan 
government with respect to the planning and funding of public projects and programs. 
Critics have argued that the original purpose of the APF was to be a state savings 
account, with the intent of offsetting drastic fluctuations within the global petroleum 
market. What evolved has caused the citizens of Alaska to view the dividend as an 




politicians have succumbed to their constituency and Alaska has denied itself the ability 
to counter the boom and bust cycle of its resource-dependent economy. (Brown et al, 
1994)  
E. COMMON PITFALLS CONFRONTING RESOURCE ABUNDANT 
NATIONS 
Because Iraq possesses significant oil reserves, many people believe that its 
natural resources are the key to its future. Although it may be true that Iraq’s oil wealth 
will be vital to its economic development, policy makers must be wary of the fact that 
economic success due to resource abundance is far from automatic. Of the 65 nations 
classified as rich in natural resources, only four have been able to attain significant per-
capita GDP growth in excess of 4 percent from 1970 to 1998, and successful long-term 
investment as reflected by GDP growth during the same period. (Gylfason, 2000) 
Iraq itself has not thrived since its discovery of oil. Most recently, oil revenues 
have been used to support a ruthless dictator’s whims that included wars with 
neighboring countries and internal travesties committed against innocent citizens. In fact, 
the country suffered from a serious debt load and the majority of its citizens lived well 
below poverty levels. Now that Saddam Hussein is gone, it is important for Iraqis to 
exploit this resource for the benefit of the population. However, Iraq continues to 
sacrifice opportunities in a world that is driving towards less dependence on oil, which 
could result in sacrificing future revenues. (Chalabi, 2004) 
According to Thorvaldur Gylfason (2000), the four common economic pitfalls 
that most affect resource rich countries are: the “resource curse,” rent seeking behavior, 
overconfidence, and the failure to invest in human capital. The resource curse is related to 
the so-called “Dutch disease.” This describes a phenomenon whereby excessive revenues 
and spending generated from a nation’s natural resources leads to inflated wages and 
prices that, in turn, impact a country’s non oil-related industries. This makes other goods 
and services less competitive, placing negative pressure on exports of other goods and 
services, ultimately reducing trade.  
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Another common theme among resource-rich countries is that there is a tendency 
for rent-seeking behavior to breed corruption between businesses and the government 
(Gylfason, 2000). This occurs when individuals and organizations attempt to make 
money by manipulating weak economic and legal policies instead of generating profit 
from trade or other forms of wealth creation. Furthermore, resource-rich countries 
commonly exhibit a sense of overconfidence in their economy and future prospects, 
leading to overspending. Finally, many countries, either by neglect or by choice, fail to 
invest in human capital (education) or critical infrastructure. 
In conclusion, for Iraq to truly benefit over the long term from their abundant 
natural resources the lessons learned from other resource-rich nations must be heeded or 
Iraq will find itself repeating those same mistakes. The most important lesson is to ensure 
that each Iraqi citizen has an ownership stake in guaranteeing the successful exploitation 
and development of their valuable exhaustible resource. (Gylfason, 2000) 
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III. IRAQ: ON THE GROUND 
A. BACKGROUND 
On March 20, 2003, a coalition of U.S. and allied forces invaded the nation of 
Iraq, seeking to depose its dictator, Saddam Hussein. On May 1, 2003, President Bush 
landed aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln and declared an end to major combat operations 
in Iraq; behind him was displayed a banner which read, “Mission Accomplished.” In 
August 2003, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) dissolved the military 
organizations of Hussein’s former regime, including the Ministry of Defense (MOD). In 
March 2004, the CPA helped establish a new MOD. The MOD was assigned 
responsibility for overall management, direction, and control of the Iraqi armed forces, 
which now includes the Iraqi Army, Air Force, and Navy. The MOD is expected to 
conduct all functions needed to sustain the armed forces and an estimated 200,000 civil 
servants and military personnel. It is also expected to develop plans, programs, and 
budgets and procure goods needed to support the current Iraqi government, the Republic 
of Iraq. (GAO, March 2007) 
It was not long after the President declared an end to major combat operations 
before a very real threat materialized in Iraq. The threat came in the form of an active 
insurgency, seeking to foment chaos and shed the blood of coalition members and 
innocent civilians in an attempt to incite civil war. Unfortunately, the U.S. reconstruction 
effort was predicated on the assumption that coalition members would be received as 
liberators and that a secure and stable environment would exist. Adding to the climate of 
chaos, as the security situation in Iraq deteriorated, it became more difficult to improve 
the oil and electricity infrastructure that required substantial repairs and modernization 
due to the previous regime’s neglect, international sanctions, and years of conflict, 
looting, and vandalism. (GAO, May 2007) Though the CPA ceded authority to the 
provisional Iraqi government on 28 June 2004, the U.S. retains formal control of the 
Multi-national Force Iraq (MNF-I) which exerts limited informal influence over policies 
of the newly independent government (Jane’s: Internal Affairs, 2007). 
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The critical issues now confronting the Iraqi people have at times seemed 
overwhelming. The key issues addressed by this analysis are: a lack of general security in 
many areas of Iraq, including an active insurgency and ethnic and sectarian tensions; a 
weak central government; and, a lack of private investment and economic development. 
The discussion of these key issues will synthesize several recent reports, including those 
of the Government Accountability Office (GAO), in order to offer an analysis of the 
critical issues that form barriers to government effectiveness and limit its ability to help 
resolve problems and provide basic services. This analysis relies heavily on the GAO’s 
extensive writing in this area, as it contains broad, cross-cutting audit work along the 
three prongs  of the U.S. national security policy strategy in Iraq—internal security and 
political and economic stability. (GAO, January 2007). 
In evaluating alternatives and making recommendations regarding the distribution 
of oil revenues, this analysis should be useful in aligning the interests of the Iraqi people 
to support greater security and investment. The implementation of these 
recommendations could create economic incentives that lead to a sense of ownership that 
result in citizens’ self-interest in preserving security in order to benefit from increased oil 
wealth. Accordingly, it is reasonable to think these incentives could align the interests of 
the people with the stability and reconstruction interests of the government of the 
Republic of Iraq. In turn, this would result in: a diminishing need for the U.S.-led MNF-I 
to provide, organize, and/or train large security forces; a boost in private domestic and 
foreign investment in key infrastructure; and, an increasingly stable and secure Iraq. 
B. A DETERIORATING SECURITY SITUATION 
The problems currently confronting the Republic of Iraq and the MNF-I are many 
and complicated--not the least of which is the deteriorating security situation. Poor 
security conditions exist in spite of the $15.4 billion U.S. program to help develop and 
sustain Iraqi security forces. Although the State Department has reported an increase in 
the number of Iraqi army and police forces trained and equipped from about 174,000 in 
July 2005 to approximately 323,000 in December 2006, violence continues and the 
security situation continues to be difficult to manage. The average number of adversary 
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attacks increased from about 70 per day in January 2006 to a record high of about 180 per 
day in October 2006, the worst month yet. In December 2006, attacks averaged 
approximately 160 per day. Sectarian and militia elements in the Iraqi security forces 
added to the brutality. This environment continues to endanger human resources, inhibit 
investment and economic growth, and places critical infrastructure at risk (GAO, May 
2007). These factors help explain the difficulty Iraq has in negotiating with coalition 
partners and in making political and economic progress in such an extremely unstable 
environment (GAO, April 2007) 
There has also been a significant death toll among Iraqi civilians in the four years 
the war has been fought, although the exact number is open to debate. ORB, a British 
polling agency cited by the Los Angeles Times (Susman, 2007), has put that figure at 
more than 1.2 million. This number was arrived at by asking 1,461 adults, “How many 
members of your household, if any, have died as a result of the conflict in Iraq since 
2003?” Based on Iraq’s estimated number of households (4,050,597), ORB says the 
figure carries a margin of error of 2.4 percent. According to ORB, nearly one in two 
households in Baghdad suffered at least one death as a result of the war, 22 percent of 
households suffered at least one fatality nationwide, and, it is said 48 percent of the 
victims were a result of gunshot wounds and 20 percent died as a result of car bombs. 
Other explosions and military bombings were blamed for most of the other fatalities. 
Both the Iraqi government and the U.S. have stated independent groups greatly 
exaggerate estimates of civilian casualties. (Susman, 2007) Whatever the exact figure, it 
is obvious Iraqi civilians have a great deal at stake in seeing a sustainable cessation in the 
level of violence. 
1. Inadequate Iraqi Security Forces 
In 2003 the Iraqi MOD announced a new plan to establish a primarily defensive 
military with a strength of about 40,000, and to place it under civilian control. Other 
security forces were also formed to assist in the stabilization of Iraq; primarily the Iraqi 
National Guard that was created in June 2004, formed from remnants of the old Civil 
Defense Corps. In May 2007, the Iraqi security services numbered 348,000 personnel. 
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These include 198,200 Ministry of Interior personnel, composed of Iraqi Police Services 
(IPS) and other forces such as the IPS Special Commando, Civil Intervention Force, and 
armored and specialized battalions. There are also 154,550 Ministry of Defense 
personnel, including the Army and National Guard, the Air Force, and the Navy. (Jane’s: 
Executive Summary, 2007) 
The reconstitution of Iraq’s security forces has not proceeded as well as hoped. 
The reliability and effectiveness of newly formed military units has been questioned, as 
Iraqi soldiers have been reluctant to act against fellow Iraqis. Performance of the National 
Guard has been uneven across units. Though these forces are increasingly capable of 
taking over local security in many parts of Iraq, the key question is whether they will 
function as loyalists to the federal government or are, in fact, disguised sectarian and 
factional militias?  
When supported by the MNF-I, the Iraqi Army is growing into a relatively 
coherent force that can be counted upon to support government objectives. However, at 
the local level, IPS is often as much a part of the problem as it is the solution, due to its 
local recruitment by factional leaders in provincial governments. (Jane’s: Executive 
Summary, 2007) Furthermore, government security forces still owe their primary 
allegiance to their constituent sectarian and factional blocks. This limits the government’s 
ability to construct the multi-ethnic security and police forces required to detect, preempt, 
and disentangle sectarian clashes at the local level. In fact, many Iraqi security forces 
actively refuse to respond to orders given them that would cause them to operate outside 
the regional areas in which they were recruited. (Jane’s: Security, 2007) 
2. Ethnic and Religious Party Militias 
Iraq is a land awash with small arms, heavy weapons, and explosives of all types. 
Citizens are allowed to own and keep a single assault rifle, usually an AK-47. The 
country is crosscut by strong sectarian and tribal-factional loyalties. Accordingly, it is 
understandable the country is dotted with sectarian and neighborhood militias. Elements 
of local and tribal communities from all sectarian blocs remain fiercely protective of their 
local autonomy, as they were under Saddam Hussein. (Jane’s: Security, 2007) 
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The fate of ethnic and religious party militias seemed to have been decided by the 
CPA in March 2004. U.S. and Iraqi officials reported the leaders of the two largest 
militias in Iraq had conditionally decided to disperse their members. The Badr Corps and 
the Kurdish Peshmerga forces were offered a chance to work for official Iraqi 
government forces or were to be allowed to claim considerable retirement payments as 
incentives to disarm and disband. Currently, U.S. officials have also said members of 
smaller militia groups will be allowed to petition for jobs with the new security forces, 
but those choosing otherwise will be confronted and, if necessary, forced to give up their 
weapons. As of August 2006, the only militias targeted (setting aside Sunni Arab 
insurgent groups) were Muqtada al-Sadr’s Jaish al-Mahdi and the Fadhila party’s Oil 
Protection Force. (Jane’s: Executive Summary, 2007)  
Though Prime Minister al-Maliki promised to move forward on the disbandment 
of militias, as of this writing, no signs of progress in disarmament, demobilization, and 
rehabilitation have been seen. No long-lasting solution to the problem of militias has been 
found, save perhaps to recruit as many militia members as possible into the security 
forces in order to gain some control over their movements, pay, and, hopefully, their 
loyalties. (Jane’s: Security, 2007) 
3. The Insurgency and Rising Ethnic and Sectarian Tensions 
The key threat is a Sunni insurgency that targets the Shia and U.S.-led MNF-I. 
Without a strong counter-terrorist strategy and political agreement between Sunni and 
Shia parties, this insurgency has the potential to throw Iraq into a civil war. Despite 
growing evidence of reconciliation between the government and Sunni insurgents, the 
government of the Republic of Iraq, headed by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, is faced 
with serious internal violence driven by a complex mesh of sectarian and factional 
drivers. (Jane’s: Executive Summary, 2007) 
The types of violence include sectarian, factional, and criminal violence, often 
occurring at high levels. The key driver for these high levels of violent incidents is 
growing factional infighting by political groups of the same religion and ethnicity, 
especially in the Shia south. Communal tensions at the neighborhood level are a critical 
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element of the problem that national politics has been unable to address. Violent incidents 
have fueled further attacks, leading to vendettas and revenge attacks. (Jane’s: Security, 
2007) 
Sectarian killings have been blamed for an increasing “Balkanization” of Iraq, as 
once multi-ethnic communities flee to common neighborhoods--a homogenizing effect 
that is a result of the migration caused by sustained sectarian killings. This exacerbates 
the potential for the type of ethnic self-annexation that was seen in the Balkans. In any 
given month, over half of the bodies entering the Baghdad morgue are killed by 
execution-style gunshot wounds, which have been interpreted as increasing “block 
warfare” at the communal, neighborhood level. (Jane’s: Security, 2007) 
The greatest insurgent threat remains in multi-ethnic areas such as Baghdad, its 
surrounding provinces, and the Sunni-Kurdish swath that borders the zone of the 
Kurdistan Regional Government. The Sunni Arab community, once the governing ethnic 
community under the Saddam Hussein-led Baath party, has had considerable trouble 
reconciling itself with its new status as a demographic and political minority. Finally, 
foreign fighters and a professional Iraqi insurgent population have settled in for a 
protracted campaign of nationwide and regional terrorist attacks.It is thought that large 
scale car bombings, assassinations, kidnappings, and attacks on critical infrastructure will 
continue throughout the current decade. (Jane’s: Security, 2007) 
C. CENTRAL GOVERNMENT 
The central government in Iraq has relatively little power, is highly dependent on 
oil and foreign assistance, and enjoys no monopoly on force. The fabric of Iraqi society is 
under attack from criminal elements, perhaps largely due to a lack of economic 
opportunity, and is threatened by sectarian violence. The government of the Republic of 
Iraq lacks any easy, near-term solutions to any of its problems. (Jane’s: Security, 2007). 
One challenging, but possibly fruitful solution investigated in this study is for the central 
government to distribute Iraq’s oil wealth to make every Iraqi citizen an owner of a share 
of the oil.  
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A transitional political process completed in December 2005, resulted in the first 
constitutionally-elected government of the post-Saddam era. However, Iraq’s new 
government does not benefit from sufficient support to craft effective solutions to 
simultaneously resolve serious security and socio-economic problems. Currently, the 
Iraqi government has met three, partly met four, and did not meet eleven of its eighteen 
benchmarks, resulting from commitments first announced by the government of Iraq in 
June 2006 (GAO, September 2007). The legislative agenda has progressed through the 
nation’s parliament at a very slow pace, with intensive and time-consuming committee 
work required to achieve consensus before each new step. (Jane’s: Executive Summary, 
2007) 
At the very outset, the government of the Republic of Iraq faced problems caused 
by a lack of management and human resource skills in key ministries of the government. 
Under the old regime, high-level ministerial officials were political appointees of Saddam 
Hussein, aligned with the Baath party. Once Hussein was ousted, members of the Baath 
party were not allowed to continue in service.  
Over 30,000 party officials were released from the civil service. Washington 
watchers interpreted this as a victory for the Pentagon in its ongoing battle with the CIA 
and State Department, which favored a more limited purge (Jane’s: Internal Affairs, 
2007). This created an immediate and vast deficiency in areas related to public 
administration, financial management, and government services in general, to include 
security. Moreover, irreconcilable Baathist former regime elements have recently been 
blamed for fomenting and facilitating anti-coalition and anti-government activities in the 
Sunni areas of Iraq (Jane’s: Security, 2007). Many Iraqi civil servants that remain are 
inadequately trained or are lacking in requisite skills. (GAO, April 2007) 
This lack of trained, loyal, and competent personnel is not limited to the various 
ministries. The lack of qualified staff and expertise extends to the electric and oil plants 
and into the fields in which they operate. This has led to difficulty in operating and 
maintaining the plants and refineries that fuel critical infrastructure, and it hampers 
coalition attempts to contribute to restructuring and rehabilitation efforts. Moreover, due 
to a lack of an inventory control system for spare parts, oil production and exports have 
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consistently fallen below key program goals. This contributes to the theft and smuggling 
of oil and its refined products, a significant loss for Iraqi citizens. (GAO, April 2007) 
Worse still, many high-level ministerial officials in the present-day administration 
represent political parties that are unresponsive to, or who openly oppose, the U.S. and its 
goals for Iraq. Political and sectarian affiliations continually jeopardize the ministries’ 
ability to provide basic services and build credibility with the people of Iraq. (GAO, April 
2007) The result is that U.S. and Iraqi security ministries are supporting Iraqi forces that 
have divided loyalties, varying degrees of capability, high absenteeism, and questionable 
dependability (GAO, March 2007). 
Due to the pressing priorities of security and politics, the Iraqi government has not 
been able to directly tackle Iraq’s economic problems. This has had the effect of 
encouraging oil smuggling by perpetuating a subsidized fuel system, discouraging 
auditing, and deepening corruption, all of which are serious problems in Iraq (Jane’s: 
Economy, 2007). In fact, the Iraqi government was ranked as the second most corrupt in 
the world by Transparency International in its 2006 world powers survey. Given the 
underdeveloped state of many Iraqi governmental institutions, this ranking is no surprise.  
According to the GAO, the government lacks the necessary programs to fight 
corruption in part due to ineffective and inadequately resourced accountability 
institutions, such as the Board of Supreme Audit, the Commission on Public Integrity, 
and the Inspector General of the Ministries. (GAO, May 2007) These organizations have 
been systematically prevented from bringing corruption cases to trial by three Iraqi prime 
ministers since 2004, each of which reinstated the Saddam-era Article 136(b) of the 
Criminal Procedures Code (which stipulates no case can be tried concerning something 
done in the ordinary course of duty without permission of the minister of the affected 
agency). This article had been suspended by CPA administrator Paul Bremer in January 
2004 to allow corruption investigations to begin. (Jane’s: Economy, 2007) 
In 2006, the World Bank and the Inspector General to the Iraqi Ministry of Oil 
estimated millions of dollars of government resources are lost annually due to oil 
smuggling or theft of refined products. The State Department has reported 10 to 30 
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percent of refined fuels are sold on the black market or smuggled out of the country for 
personal profit. Inadequate metering, injection, corruption, theft, and sabotage account 
for approximately $1.8 to $5.5 billion per year (GAO, July 2007). The State Department 
believes government officials have also profited from these activities. Worst still, the 
U.S. Embassy has documents in its custody stating the insurgency has been at least partly 
supported by profits from smuggled oil products sold on the black market in Iraq. (GAO, 
May 2007) 
A lack of modern technology has also had a big impact on resource management 
efforts, and it contributes to the government’s continuing lack of ability to control 
corruption. Iraq’s banking system is mostly ineffective and leaves the government 
dependent on cash-based transactions with which to discharge its obligations. The 
Ministry of Interior relies on manual systems with hand-written ledgers and a payroll 
system reliant on cash payments. Some Iraqi police have even been seen leaving their 
posts to deliver cash to their families. At any given time, the DoD estimates one-third of 
all Iraqi soldiers are on leave for the purpose of returning home to provide money to their 
families (GAO, March 13, 2007). U.S. officials estimate 20 to 30 percent of Ministry of 
the Interior personnel are “ghost employees.” These are, essentially, people who do not 
exist. Their salaries are paid only to be collected by other governmental executives. This 
level of corruption jeopardizes future international assistance and undermines the 
government’s ability to make effective use of current reconstruction assistance. (GAO, 
April 2007) 
Adding to the problems of funding flows caused by corruption is the 
government’s apparent inability to spend its capital budgets effectively and efficiently. 
This inability to expend money (and expend it appropriately) raises serious questions for 
the government and creates skepticism on the part of its stakeholders that it can improve 
basic services and make a difference in their daily lives (GAO, March 22, 2007). The 
issues that affect the government’s ability to effect positive change will be broken down 
and analyzed below. 
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1. Analysis of Financial Management in the Iraqi Government 
An interesting limitation in the government’s ability to help resolve Iraq’s 
problems is its incapacity to execute its budgets for capital goods and public projects in a 
timely manner. Using data provided by the GAO (GAO, April 2007), a breakdown of the 
Iraqi government’s budget executions is illustrated in Figures 1 – 4. Noting the Iraqi 
fiscal year begins on 1 January, these charts reflect approximately 8 months worth of 
budget execution data. From a U.S. government budget analyst’s perspective, the figures 
are fairly staggering. In the case of 2006 capital goods expenditures (Figures 1 and 2), 
only one ministry’s budget is more than 50 percent expended, two-thirds of the way into 
the fiscal year. As budgets are normally considered representative of a nation’s public 
policy, it is interesting to note this is for the Ministry of Justice, at 66.7 percent expended.  
The next highest ministry’s percentage of expenditure is “Others,” at 28.31 
percent. The third highest is the Ministry of Oil, at 20 percent, especially noteworthy 
given Iraq mostly relies on degraded and obsolete equipment to extract the oil that 
provides a majority of the nation’s financial resources (GAO, February 2007). From 
there, the percentages of budgets expended descend into the tens and single digits.  
For a nation struggling to restore its physical infrastructure, security, and to 
establish itself as a legitimate government, these numbers, perhaps, speak volumes about 
the government’s ability to sustain itself. This is reflected in the staggering figure 
reported for the Iraqi Ministry of Defense. Eight months into the fiscal year, only about 1 













Figure 1.   2006 Annual Iraqi Ministry Budgets VS Actual Expenditures for Capital 
Goods through August 2006 (After GAO, April 2007) 
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Figure 2.   2006 Annual Iraqi Ministry Budgets VS Actual Expenditures for Capital 
Goods through August 2006 (After GAO, April 2007) 
2006 Annual Iraqi Ministry Budgets VS Actual Expenditures for

























Capital Goods Budgeted $233.0 $864.0 $272.0 
Capital Goods Expended $25.0 $12.0 $77.0 
Percent Expended 10.73% 1.39% 28.31%
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*Iraqi fiscal year begins 1 January
 
Moving on to ministerial budgets expended for capital projects through August 
2006 (Figures 3 and 4), the Ministry of Finance spent over twice its allotted budget (224 
percent expended). Of all ministerial budgets documented by the GAO, the next highest 
capital projects budget expended is the Ministry of Electricity at only 34.81 percent, 
which was identified as one of the key infrastructure projects being undertaken by the 
MNF-I and the U.S. The third highest ministry’s budget expenditure percentage is 
“Others,” the fourth is the Ministry of Water at 24.5 percent, and then ministry 








Figure 3.   2006 Annual Iraqi Ministry Budgets VS Actual Expenditures for Capital 
Projects through August 2006 (After GAO, April 2007) 
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Figure 4.   2006 Annual Iraqi Ministry Budgets VS Actual Expenditures for Capital 
Projects through August 2006 (After GAO, April 2007) 
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One consequence of the budget-execution problems in Iraq is a lack of clean 
drinking water. Due to the collapse of Iraq’s water and sewerage system in September 
2004, there was an outbreak of a virulent strain of hepatitis in and around Baghdad. Over 
215 cases were diagnosed, suspected to be only a fraction of the actual cases caused by 
sewage-contaminated drinking water. (Jane’s: Demography, 2007) 
According to the GAO (March 22, 2007), dismal documented expenditure rates 
are also a result of unclear budgeting and procurement rules. Combined with multiple 
rules and regulations promulgated under the former regime, the CPA, and the current 
government, this has created a perfect storm of opportunity for corruption and 
mismanagement.  
 31
In any true democracy, the legitimacy and authority of the government can only 
come from the will and consent of the governed. The risk is that Iraqi citizens grow ever 
more frustrated and disillusioned with their government, leading to gains in the 
insurrection’s legitimacy and power. GAO reports document the limited ability of the 
government to effectively procure critically required equipment and infrastructure, to 
enter into contracts, and to make the necessary payments that would ensure government 
obligations are worth the paper on which they are printed. This is unfortunate, as the 
ability to support reconstruction is a key component of an active and effective counter-
insurgency (Jane’s: Economy, 2007). To date, the Iraqi government has over $10 billion 
in reconstruction funds available, and it is unclear how, when or if they will be spent 
(GAO, September 2007).  
Further hampering the government is its lack of information management, 
technology, and data-processing capabilities. This contributes materially to difficulties in 
acquiring, distributing, and maintaining weapons, vehicles, and equipment. In answer to 
this, the U.S.-led coalition has provided significant resources to help develop Iraq’s 
security forces and has 215 military and civilian advisors supporting the ministries.  
The U.S. recently signed a foreign military sales (FMS) agreement with Iraq that, 
according to U.S. personnel, allows Iraq to bypass its ineffective procurement systems to 
purchase equipment directly from the U.S. Iraq has deposited $1.9 billion into its FMS 
account. (GAO, March 22, 2007) However, given the factors listed throughout this 
discussion, it is unclear whether or not this will fix the problem since Iraq does not 
possess effective institutions, procedures, and processes necessary to execute this plan. 
Unless and until effective control measures are put in place, these efforts will most likely 
continue to be stymied by corruption, intimidation, misappropriation of resources, and 
competing political and sectarian priorities. 
D. A LACK OF ECONOMIC STABILITY 
It is clear budgets in Iraq have become little more than an annual wish-list. As 
capacity building has stalled and even been reversed in key institutions, budgets have 
become gradually harder to pass. The 2007 budget passed two months after the 31 
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December 2006 deadline set out in the Financial Management Law. Institutional paralysis 
in the short-term appears to be more than a security problem. Bottlenecks, such as 
inconsistent reporting procedures between ministries, use of spending instructions that 
differ by ministry and province, misappropriation of allocated funds, and poor 
maintenance of cash ledgers, would persist under even normal conditions. However, 
spending capacity is not uniformly weak. Recurrent spending, which is relatively simple 
to budget and does not require long lead times, is stronger. This reflects the bias in the 
economy towards subsidized food rations, pensions, employment, wages, salaries, and 
agricultural subsidies. (Jane’s: Economy, 2007) 
While Iraq has made significant progress in price liberalization, subsidies on 
several key goods such as food, fuel, electricity, and other utilities are very large, adding 
up to as much as 50 percent or more of GDP. In the future, Iraq will be under pressure to 
make painful cuts to domestic fuel and utilities subsidies, and food rations. In addition, 
the Iraqi pension system is financially unsustainable, inefficient, and inequitable. Current 
financing mechanisms can impose large costs on employers and discourage job creation. 
(Jane’s: Economy, 2007) 
When the New Iraqi Dinar was introduced in 2003, the newly independent 
Central Bank of Iraq tried to stabilize the exchange rate and arrest inflation. The policy 
instruments utilized were foreign exchange auctions, reserve requirements, overdraft 
facilities for banks, and other lending facilities. The Central Bank tried to promote 
efficient short-term management of liquid instruments by financial institutions and to 
implement the central bank’s stated monetary policies.  
The policy’s success is measured by some intermediate variables which include 
the yield curve, rate of growth of the money supply, and the rate of exchange. An 
efficient payment system and reduction of excessive reserves were key goals. Using 
foreign exchange auctions, the New Iraqi Dinar was successfully introduced, resulting in 
a stable exchange rate. Foreign banks were allowed to open branches and to engage in 
joint ventures with private Iraqi banks. The capital base of private banks was also 
increased. Initially, inflation decreased from around 70 percent to as little as 25 percent in  
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2004. Since then, however, inflation has begun to creep back up to levels resembling the 
Baathist era. This leads to a continuing challenge for the Central Bank and Iraqi 
government. (Jane’s: Economy, 2007) 
The Iraqi government’s revenues are largely derived from oil receipts, with a 
small share of revenue coming from income and excise taxes, interest on unspent 
government oil wealth, revenue from state-owned enterprises, and a plethora of usury 
charges and fees. Foreign direct investment is not yet a significant factor in Iraq’s formal 
economy. In contrast, oil accounts for some 66 percent of the economy, so export 
volumes are critical.  
Though exports have decreased to around 1.6M barrels per day (bpd), from an 
April 2004 high of 1.8M bpd, Iraq still nets approximately $2.75 - $3B per month due to 
currently high oil prices. Importantly, very strong surpluses of unspent oil receipts gives 
the economy a cushion, but also reveals that a key constraint is spending capacity, not 
revenue generation. (Jane’s: Economy, 2007) 
Until the issues of Iraqi debt restructuring and compensation payments are 
resolved, Iraq is unlikely to regain full control of its fiscal affairs. This has important 
implications for the financing of capital projects. A significant overhang of public debt, 
most of which was created during the devastating Hussein era, creates a drag on the 
government’s budget and on the economy.  
Significant budgetary breathing space could be created by canceling some of the 
debt Iraq owes, which is currently estimated at between $78 and $89 billion. The debt, 
which experts believe could be reduced to approximately $53.5 billion, based 
conditionally on its ability to meet certain targets, is estimated at more than 300% of 
Iraq’s gross domestic product. Up to $7 billion of the debt is owed to private Iraqi 
citizens. (Jane’s: Economy, 2007). Iraq’s main creditors will not write off debts until they 
see progress on national reconciliation, economic reform, and a reduction of violence 
(Jane’s: External Affairs, 2007). 
According to Robert Looney (2006b), many problems in the current Iraqi 
economy are a result of fundamental supply and demand factors in the labor market. One 
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of the factors Looney documented is a bulging youth population that is underserved by 
the country’s education system. In addition, there is a considerable lack of employment 
training and opportunities. Accordingly, Iraq is well behind nearby Arab nations in its 
investment in human resources, and it lacks the educated, skilled workers required for 
vibrant private sector expansion of formal markets. While there are venerable state 
employment programs that provide incentives for public sector employment, few exist in 
the private sector, which sees little growth due to recent instability. The first official 
postwar look at joblessness from the Iraqi Central Statistical Office reported 28 percent 
unemployment for Iraq in October 2003 (Foote et al., 2004).  
There is also a deficiency in social capital, specifically a lack of trust regarding 
property rights and contract law, which confines most transactions in the private sector to 
nontaxable informal market exchanges. As the formal economy increasingly lacks the 
ability to provide incomes to households, economic pressure increases the need to resort 
to informal activities and shadow-economic practices such as drug trafficking, 
prostitution, and the like. Looney claims adding these factors to the hostility, lawlessness, 
and concerns over future instability, has undermined the confidence of investors and 
prevented “market-driven mechanisms” from playing their predicted role in the days 
following attempted market reforms installed by the CPA. (Looney, 2006b) 
While it is relatively easy to measure economic impacts, qualitative human 
impacts are harder to measure. There may also be a direct correlation between the level of 
violence and how Iraqis assess their economic conditions.  
Foote et al., (2004) document that polls taken from the Iraqi Central Statistical 
Office reflect measurably higher levels of violence in areas in which economic and labor-
related opportunities were the most bleak. One discouraged and unemployed man from 
Sadr City (a poor, predominately Shia area of Baghdad) was quoted as saying, “I haven’t 
been working at all for the last two weeks. If I stay like this for another week my family 
will starve, and if someone comes along with $50 and asks me to toss a grenade at the 
Americans, I’ll do it with pleasure.” (Banerjee and Cushman, 2003, as cited by Foote et 
al., 2004) 
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E. THE THREAT OF REGIONAL SPILL OVER 
It is thought that if the security situation in Iraq suffers a major deterioration, or if 
the central government of Iraq dissolves at some future point, the resulting power vacuum 
might suck in regional states such as Turkey and Iran and present a risk to the territorial 
integrity of the country. Most certainly, Iraq will be the jihadist theater of choice for as 
long as the U.S. maintains a significant presence. (Jane’s: Executive Summary, 2007) 
Until multi-national forces are drawn down to insignificant numbers, Iraq offers 
jihadists an unparalleled opportunity to experience what is perceived as a legitimate 
defensive jihad in a foreign land against the U.S. military. There are growing indicators 
that Iraq is being consciously used as an incubator for jihadists and that such fighters are 
being sent to neighboring states and perhaps beyond, to foment hostility and unrest. In 
this context, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Syria, and Jordan are in particular peril. The issue of 
inbound and outbound jihadists will continue to further complicate Iraq’s regional 
relations. (Jane’s: Executive Summary, 2007) 
F. SUMMARY 
This chapter synthesized key developments discussed in several recent 
publications, including those reported by the Government Accountability Office (GAO). 
The analysis indicates that the critical issues that form barriers to Iraqi government 
effectiveness and limit its ability to make public investment, develop fundamental market 
institutions, and provide basic public services are: (1) a lack of general security in many 
areas of Iraq, including an active insurgency and rising ethnic and sectarian tensions; (2) 
a weak central government; and (3) a lack of private investment and economic 
development. 
This analysis should be useful in evaluating alternatives and in making 
recommendations, including the possibility of privatizing state-owned oil resources and 
distributing oil revenue to the citizens of Iraq. The implementation of these 
recommendations could create economic incentives that would lead to a sense of 
ownership, resulting in citizens’ increased interest in preserving security in order to 
 36
benefit from increased oil wealth. It is reasonable to think these incentives could align the 
interests of the people with the interests of the government of the Republic of Iraq—
assuming their objective is to promote stability and reconstruction. 
The result of giving every Iraqi citizen a direct financial stake in the oil would be: 
a diminishing need for the U.S.-led MNF-I to provide, organize, and/or train large 
security forces; carefully monitored investments in infrastructure; and incentives to 
prevent destruction of the factors of oil production as Iraqi citizens found themselves 
bound together in their common interest to preserve and expand their new-found wealth. 
The end result would hopefully be an increasingly stable and secure Iraq. 
The risk to Iraqis, to the region, and to the U.S. and its allies that would result 
from Iraq as a failed state is too large to be ignored. Though the issues confronted by Iraq 
have at times seemed overwhelming, this thesis proposes that if there is to be a long-run 
solution, it must be one that is effective at the grass-roots level. In simple terms, this 
means there must be consensus by the people that the solutions being proposed by local 
leaders actually address their concerns. 
Hamre and Sullivan (2002) have speculated that the four distinct yet interrelated 
categories of tasks that must be addressed in post-conflict reconstruction are: security, 
justice and reconciliation, social and economic well-being, and governance and 
participation. After an initial analysis of the problems facing modern day Iraq and a 
thorough analysis of several alternative methods other nations have implemented to 
distribute natural resource wealth, a set of recommendations will be presented that 
attempt to address many of the social and economic concerns of the Iraqi people.  
Given Iraq’s history of large government subsidies and a strong, dictatorial central 
government, the recommendations presented here could serve as one possible way to 
alleviate public burdens and economic distortions caused by excessive government 
handouts, and illuminate ways to create real value for Iraqi citizens as they become 
shareholders of the world’s second largest known oil reserves. This project’s hypothesis 
is that by satisfying these economic and social concerns, efforts toward the other three 
pillars, security, justice and reconciliation, and governance and participation, will be 
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greatly buoyed as the Iraqi people increasingly see it as in their interest to become part of 
the process, to actively combat the insurrection, and to demand increased transparency in 
government activities. The privatization experience of Czechoslovakia and Poland will be 
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IV.  THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT PROBLEM IN IRAQ 
The “principal-agent problem” is an idea developed for use in political science 
and economics. It concerns identifying ways to align the interests of one party closely 
enough with another so they are motivated to act on their behalf. The problem arises in 
evaluating different incentive mechanisms the principal might use to compensate the 
agent for tasks that are valuable to the principal, but that are costly for the agent, and 
where it is difficult for the principal to observe the effort of the agent and to gauge the 
ultimate outcome of the relationship. It is often seen in contractual relationships that exist 
under conditions of information asymmetry, risk, and uncertainty. When this occurs, the 
principal cannot be assured the agent has acted on his or her behalf, and to what extent, or 
even if, the contract has been executed. Thus, the principal must provide incentives to the 
agent to ensure this is so. According to game theory, the principal-agent problem 
involves changing the rules of the game so that rational and self-interested choices made 
by the agent are aligned with the desires of the principal. (Eisenhardt, 1989) 
The principal-agent problem in Iraq revolves around the fact the U.S. (the 
“principal”) wants to extricate itself from the occupation of Iraq, but only under 
conditions that ensure stability and economic opportunity for Iraqi citizens (the “agents”). 
The ideal for the U.S. would be to find a solution to this Principal-Agent problem that 
motivates individual Iraqi citizens (the agents) to choose for themselves behavior that 
will foster greater security and stability for their families and for the future of their 
country. The following descriptions of the privatization of Eastern Bloc countries 
(Chapter V) and descriptions of alternative oil revenue distribution models (Chapter VI) 
are illustrations of some of the solutions to principal-agent problems implemented by 
other nations in the past. Many nations dealt directly with their principal-agent problems 
through the distribution of previously publicly-held resources directly to the people, and 
some, at their peril, ignored their principal-agent problems. 
A qualitative cost-benefit analysis conducted in Chapter VII offers an analysis of 
these alternative models that is used to support several recommendations. Moreover, it 
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serves as an instructive and cautionary case analysis for policy makers working in the 
area of stabilization and reconstruction—especially with respect to the nation of Iraq. 
Later, in Chapter VIII, an in-depth analysis is provided of the draft Iraqi 
hydrocarbon legislation currently being debated in the Iraqi parliament. This legislation 
has been criticized for many of its perceived weaknesses, chief among them that it is 
vague, incomplete, and is interpreted in widely varying ways. Another key concern is that 
the draft oil law will provide oil revenues to the regions on a per-capita basis. This 
analysis will show that the draft oil law will leave many disenfranchised, based on where 
they live, and could, therefore, serve as a flashpoint for those who are not included. Thus, 
the draft oil law offers an incomplete solution to the principal-agent problem in Iraq. 
Finally, in the recommendations chapter of the project, Chapter IX, some critical 
analyses of several options for oil fund management similar to those provided in Chapter 
VIII will be offered as possible alternatives. This will lead to specific recommendations 
that illustrate the types of economic incentives that must be implemented, or avoided, to 
best help the nation of Iraq solve the principal-agent problem. 
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V. PRIVATIZATION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND POLAND 
A. PRIVATIZATION 
It is important to understand that privatization in the context of this paper relates 
to the transfer of government controlled assets to private ownership and operation. The 
liberation of Iraq has created an opportunity to privatize many state owned assets from 
telecommunications to its vast oil reserves. However, as a number of other countries have 
learned, privatization is not a simple process. Secular tension and the lack of stability add 
to the difficulties Iraq faces. Still there are important lessons to be learned from the 
experience of other countries. 
Several aspects of privatization need to be considered prior to implementation. 
Determining the appropriate vehicle to implement a privatization effort is obviously of 
great importance. Of major concern are questions such as: whether government 
enterprises will be distributed to citizens for a fee or for free; determining who qualifies 
as a citizen; and whether or not foreign investors can participate? Another concern 
involves the transparency of the selected privatization process. This step is important in 
gaining the support of the public. Programs should avoid being overly complex or 
secretive to avoid questions of legitimacy. Information should be relatively easy to access 
or acquire for anyone with a need to know (Shafik, 1993). Finally, the timeframe or speed 
with which privatization should be completed is important. A government must be 
prepared to administer a massive undertaking in implementing a privatization or revenue 
sharing plan. In many privatizations the judicial system, contract law, stock markets, etc. 
are not well established, therefore much work needs to be done to prepare for full 
privatization. (World Bank, 1999) 
As stated earlier, the two widely accepted approaches to facilitate the conversion 
of state-owned enterprises to private sector ownership are commonly referred to as the 
Governmental, or “gradual approach,” and the market approach--also known as “Shock 
Therapy” (Pohl & Claessens, 1997). Studying other privatization efforts, even where not 
all of the conditions are similar to those found in Iraq, can still provide helpful insights to 
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increase the likelihood of success, We begin by looking at the voucher program 
implemented in the Czech Republic, followed by an examination of the investment fund 
program utilized by Poland. A broad discussion and evaluation of these experiences 
concludes this section.  
B. CZECH REPUBLIC 
In Czechoslovakia, the state-owned command economy controlled up to 98% of 
all businesses prior to its collapse (Shafik, 1993.) The fall of communism opened the 
door to a shift to a free market. The need to privatize nearly the entire economy raised 
concerns as to whether the strategy should focus on quick reform causing short-term pain, 
but perhaps a shorter recovery period, or slow reform causing less short-term problems 
but risking a longer recovery. While there was much debate about which method would 
be best, the quick reform alternative was implemented in early 1991. (Megginson & 
Netter, 2001) 
In order to implement this aggressive transfer of assets, it was important first to 
set goals to be achieved by the privatization. According to Megginson and Netter (2001) 
these were to: first, gain support from the public for privatization; second, transfer 
ownership from the state to the private sector; third, improve economic performance, 
efficiency, and control of privatized companies themselves; and finally, prevent foreign 
domination of the process. To achieve these goals it was necessary to gain the support of 
citizens. It was believed that this was critical to ensuring successful privatizations. The 
plan used to gain this support consisted of three parts: restitution, small business public 
auctions, and large business public vouchers. (World Bank, 1999) 
Restitution refers to returning property to prior owners if that property had been 
seized by force since 1948. This amounted to nearly 100,000 residences and 20,000 
businesses (such as service and trade companies) being returned. Small business public 
auctions were, just as the name suggests, the auctioning of smaller state-owned 
businesses, which were open to all citizens. However, most of these were purchased by 
the same management that profited from them during communist control. Finally, the 
large business public voucher privatization effort consisted of different stages of voucher 
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offerings that could be used to purchase shares of a single company or a block of 
companies similar to a mutual fund. (Shafik, 1995) 
The voucher system went through several proposals and transformations before 
final implementation. Proposals ranged from issuing free vouchers to citizens to offering 
vouchers for sale worldwide. The final plan allowed citizens over the age of 18 to 
purchase a voucher booklet worth 1,000 points for what amounted to the average weekly 
wage in the country. The purpose of the fee was to compensate for the cost associated 
with managing the new voucher program. Citizens would then register their vouchers at 
one of the state registration centers, allowing them to exchange their vouchers for shares 
of state-owned companies that were simultaneously being converted to private 
companies. (Leeds, 1993) 
Many restrictions were placed on foreign investors to prevent them from easily 
acquiring crucial state assets during the discounted sell off, although some concessions 
were made for some “strategic” foreign multinationals. Foreign investment was invited 
from Volkswagen, Philip Morris, Proctor and Gamble, and General Motors. These 
companies were required to establish long-term goals for their investments, helping to 
establish public confidence in their commitments. (Leeds, 1993) 
Viewed in hindsight the voucher privatization plan implemented by the Czech 
Republic achieved varying levels of success. Compared to its initial goals, the plan 
successfully gained support for privatization by the public, which resulted in a rapid 
transformation of the command economy into a market economy.  
However, the process did little to improve the performance of some companies 
due to soft budget constraints and not enough incentives to restructure the newly 
organized businesses. This is a significant concern since it is widely expected an 
important part of privatization is that private companies are run more efficiently than 
government programs. Finally, the Czech Republic was successful in preventing foreign 
entities from dominating the process, keeping foreign ownership to less than three 
percent of the whole. However, evidence suggests foreign direct investment is one of the 
best ways to kick-start any economy. Today every successful economy in the world is 
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actively competing to attract foreign direct investment (Megginson & Netter, 2001). 
Therefore, while the intentions of the plan were designed to protect citizen’s rights and 
opportunities, the growth of the country’s economy suffered as a result. 
Megginson and Netter (2001) also detailed the main goals of privatization as 
explained by Prince Waterhouse Coopers as: first, raise available state funds through 
ownership transfer; second, improve economic efficiency of privatized industries; third, 
reduce government involvement in the economy; fourth, broaden the ownership structure; 
fifth, create competition; and, finally, transition from a state-owned to a free-market 
structure. By these standards, the government’s only real shortfall was the lack of focus 
on raising available state funds. However, by shifting focus away from the generation of 
state funds, the government made several positive changes, such as increasing the amount 
of foreign investment allowed, that has since benefited the economy. (World Bank, 1999) 
While the Czech privatization was successful in accomplishing most of its 
original goals, the perception after the fact is that it did not provide the economic miracle 
many expected. The Czech Republic benefited from having some valuable assets, being 
located in close proximity to some of the larger Western markets, and the fact that it had 
a tradition of free enterprise dating back prior to 1945 (Goldstein, 1997.) Many 
neighboring countries achieved similar successes through different means. Poland is one 
such country, and is the subject of the next analysis. 
C. POLAND 
Poland was in a different situation than the Czech Republic when they began their 
privatization efforts. Over 50% of all retail trade, consumer and service firms were 
already in private hands. The Polish government chose gradual privatization over the 
relatively quick approach taken by the Czech Republic. (Vinton, 1993) 
Poland’s plan included five major privatization programs: Capital or 
commercialization, direct, coupon or voucher, small-scale, and complementary methods. 
These programs followed the more traditional methods of privatization that favor the sale 
of shares to foreign and domestic investors. (Vinton, 1993) 
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Capital privatization entailed selling companies through initial public offerings. 
During the initial phase of capital privatization, the government kept majority ownership 
until the second phase when negotiations could take place with the new majority 
shareholders. 
Direct privatization simply involved selling off small to medium sized businesses 
with no financial problems, mostly to current employee or management teams. Buyers 
were offered a low lease rate to accommodate such takeovers.  
The “coupon or voucher privatization” was only a small part of the Polish plan 
and was not nearly as involved as the Czech system. Mainly this plan was designed to 
reassure citizens that privatization was in their best interest. “Small-scale privatization” 
involved the quick sell-off of small retail and service companies. These again were 
usually sold to previous employees below market value. (Pohl & Claessens, 1997) 
Finally, the “complementary methods” of privatization were used to solve issues 
with companies that needed restructuring or that were going to have to go through 
bankruptcy or liquidation. The state did not collect revenue for these costly undertakings. 
(Tattum, 1995) 
Poland had several areas of concern for their privatization process. As stated 
above, many of the initiatives favored purchases by insiders since they were the only 
ones that understood the potential and current state of the company. The gradual 
privatization process hurt many organizations that had to endure the wait. In many cases 
the government could not expedite the transfer of assets to private shareholders quickly 
enough to allow for future planning. Other problems involved the government 
maintaining majority control of companies long after initial privatization. This was again 
part of the gradual implementation plan. However, it slowed economic development and 
efficiency improvements that are critical to ensuring successful privatization. Another 
concern involved the limited voucher plan that only included 10% of state assets being 
made available for purchase by the public under this program. (Tattum, 1995) 
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D. SUCCESS OR FAILURE? 
Measuring the degree of success or failure of a privatization program is a difficult 
task given the number of variables involved, many of which are difficult to control. 
Goldstein (1997) states that the success or failure of privatizations can be predicted based 
on information available in academic financial intermediation literature. The difficulty 
then is whether the government can successfully help to: first, reorient the population’s 
view of property rights; second, encourage a wealth-generating mindset; and, finally, 
build basic financial institutions to support new financial markets. The stability of a 
country implementing such reforms is critical (Lipton, Sachs, & Summers, 1990). The 
Czech Republic benefited from a solid foundation of diversified assets, a rapid 
implementation plan, and a mix of national and international investors. Poland, on the 
other hand, chose a slow transition, to restructure companies prior to privatization, and 
ultimately created less total revenue for the government. (Megginson & Netter, 2001) 
Despite following different paths, privatization helped each country to 
successfully transition from a state-owned command economy to a market economy, 
although not without problems. The Czech Republic’s rapid approach overlooked many 
transparency and accountability issues such as fraud, looting, and price gouging 
(Goldstein, 1997). Poland’s slow approach suffered from high unemployment and below 
average economic growth, as industries were forced to endure the drawn-out process 
(Vinton, 1993.) There is no way to name a clear-cut winner between the voucher system 
employed by Poland and the voucher program of the Czech Republic considering both 
began the process under different circumstances. Both programs did a respectable job in 
accomplishing the goals set prior to privatization. Neither expected the process to be easy 
and both still have legitimate concerns to contend with today. (Pohl & Claessens, 1997) 
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VI. DESCRIPTION OF ALTERNATIVE MODELS 
A. IRAQ’S CENTRALIZED MODEL 
1. Nationalization of the Oil Industry 
The nationalization of the Iraqi oil industry in the early 1970s was a widely 
supported movement that gave the central government direct control over the nation’s 
primary source of revenue--oil (Cummins, 2007). At the time, many Iraqis felt they were 
being unfairly exploited by foreign oil companies operating within their country, and 
were glad to see the industry finally come under Iraqi control.  
Concurrent with the nationalization of Iraq’s oil industry was the OPEC led rise in 
the price of oil and political unrest within Iran. The culmination of these events resulted 
in substantial increases in oil exports from Iraq; oil revenues during this period grew from 
$1 billion in 1971 to over $26 billion by 1980. (Alnaswari, 2001) More recently, 
according to the Heritage Foundation, “The U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) 
estimates the Saddam Hussein regime generated $10.1 billion in illegal revenues by 
exploiting the Oil-for-Food program, including $5.7 billion from oil smuggling and $4.4 
billion in illicit surcharges on oil sales and after-sales charges on suppliers.” (Gardiner, 
2004) 
2. Centralized Control 
During the 1970s, Iraq entered a period of relative prosperity. The economic 
system, however, developed an irreversible dependence on revenues generated from the 
oil industry. Oil income to the state quickly supplanted the government’s reliance on tax 
revenues generated from its citizens. The government, “no longer needing its citizens to 
collect taxes to finance state activities” (Alnaswari, 2001), was able to allocate the 
nation’s new found wealth as they saw fit. Under this highly centralized system, oil 
revenues flowed into state coffers primarily from overseas sales of state owned oil, and 
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the state subsequently invested those funds in agriculture, state industries, education, 
healthcare, social services, the military, and other programs. (Alnaswari, 2001) 
3. Key Elements 
There are several key elements to consider regarding Iraq’s centralized model (see 
Figure 5). First, political power remained in the hands of a few ruling elites. Second, 
virtually all of the nation’s wealth was in the form of oil and was completely under 
central government control. Moreover, the government’s lack of reliance upon its 
population to generate tax revenues diminished the government’s accountability and 
responsibility to its people. The combination of these elements allowed Saddam Hussein 
and his regime to transform the government into a dictatorship and exert widespread 
control over the country and its economy. Having led Iraq into several disastrous wars, 
Hussein’s actions ultimately bankrupted the nation. Combined with prolonged economic 
sanctions Hussein’s actions had devastating effects on Iraq’s economic system and 
infrastructure. The catastrophic series of events which have befallen Iraq over the last 30 
years is not dissimilar to the “natural resource curse” which afflicts many other resource 
















B. REPUBLIC OF IRAQ MODEL (DRAFT LAW) 
1. Background 
Saddam Hussein’s removal from power in the spring of 2003 was the culmination 
of Operation Enduring Freedom. This period marked an end to major combat operations 
and the formation of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). The role of the CPA was 
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to act as a government caretaker until a newly formed Iraqi government could be 
established. During this time, a “de-Baathification” process was conducted by the CPA to 
remove any remnants of Saddam’s ruling party from government service. The CPA was 
then replaced by the Iraqi Interim Government and subsequently the Iraqi Transitional 
Government. The first permanent government of Iraq took power on 20 May 2006. 
2. The Draft Law 
Building upon the principles established by the Iraqi Constitution, a draft law 
outlining Iraq’s official oil and gas policy is currently being debated within Iraq’s 
Council of Representatives. The two most applicable sections of the Constitution are 
Article (110) which states: “Oil and gas is the property of all the Iraqi people in all the 
regions and provinces” and Article (111): “The federal government will administer oil 
and gas extracted from current fields in cooperation with the governments of the 
producing regions and provinces on condition that the revenues will be distributed fairly 
in a manner compatible with the demographical distribution all over the country.” 
(Republic of Iraq, 2005) 
Iraq’s hydrocarbons law has been purposefully left vague in many areas so as to 
appease many of the opposing factions within the legislature. As it stands, the current 
draft of the oil and gas policy attempts to establish three key principles. First, the central 
government will retain control over the distribution of oil receipts amongst the regions 
and ensure a fair and equitable distribution based on the population of those regions. 
Second, the law calls for a de-centralization of the development of the oil industry. The 
Ministry of Oil’s role will primarily be administrative and focus on the continued 
development of federal policy. The role of the new Iraq National Oil Company will be to 
manage and operate all producing oil fields, pipelines and terminals. Third, the law grants 
regional governments the ability to enter into exploratory and developmental contracts 
with foreign oil companies pending federal government approval. (Jane’s, 2007) The 
fundamental change from the previous regime appears to be a shift from central 
government ownership and control to regional ownership and control, with some central 
government oversight. 
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3. Key Elements 
The current draft law strongly favors the interests of the Kurdish and Shia factions 
within the government for several reasons. A majority of Iraq’s known oil reserves are 
located in the Kurdish controlled north and in the predominantly Shia south. The Sunni 
minority is primarily located in the center of the country and controls virtually no oil or 
gas reserves. Moreover, the Sunni faction lacked representation in the initial development 
of the draft law, due in part to many Sunni’s having once been members of Saddam 
Hussein’s Baathist party (see Figure 6). (Kasaev, 2007) 
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Another important aspect of the current Iraqi model is that many questions remain 
unanswered. Although the Constitution and the draft law stipulate a “fair and equitable 
distribution” of oil receipts to the regions based on a per capita basis, it doesn’t describe 
specifically how much will be distributed or for what purposes. Furthermore, given the 
paucity of census data for Iraq’s regions, it is not clear how the central government is 
going to ensure this fair and equitable distribution. It is also unclear how the government 
will divide the revenues from newly developed fields or deal with foreign participation. 
“How will taxes and royalties be collected?” (Cummins, 2007) 
According to Susman (2007), 
The draft law represents a key benchmark in the Iraqi government’s ability 
to overcome sectarian divisions, but the fact that it remains in deliberation 
close to a year after its introduction is a stark reminder of how far there is 
yet to go, particularly when considering that many policy and operational 
specifics have not been identified.  
C. ALASKA PERMANENT FUND MODEL 
1. History 
The Alaska Permanent Fund (APF) was established in 1976. The primary reason 
for its creation was to preserve the benefits of limited natural oil resources for future 
citizens of the state of Alaska and to transform it into a more fungible resource, namely 
cash. A secondary reason for establishing the APF “…was to keep oil revenues away 
from the politicians who, it was feared, would spend it on wasteful government 
operations.” (Goldsmith, 2002) With the flow of oil beginning in 1977, the fund grew at a 
rapid pace and exceeded $26.5 billion at the turn of the millennium. 
2. Qualifications 
After some initial growing pains, the dividend calculations have remained 
predominantly fixed since 1983. Simply stated, the dividend formula pays out 
approximately 25 percent of the annual realized earnings from Alaska’s oil revenues to 
qualified applicants, averaged over a five year period,. This moving average helps 
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smooth out any short term political or economic volatility and tends to stabilize the 
distribution of assets from year to year. In order to collect the dividend, a person must be 
a permanent resident of the state of Alaska with intent to remain a future resident. They 
must maintain their residency in the state unless otherwise authorized to live out of state. 
Some examples include college attendance or military service.  
3. Economic Effects 
It is undeniable that the annual infusion provided to the populace of the state of 
Alaska of over $1 billion dollars has had a dramatic effect on the state’s overall economic 
growth and financial vitality. As noted by the Economic Policy Institute of Washington 
D.C., “A prosperity dividend…can serve as a booster shot to the economy” (Appelbaum, 
2001). This is exactly what happened to Alaska’s state economy immediately after the 
passing of the APF legislation in 1976. The elimination of the state’s income tax, coupled 
with this injection of wealth, served as a stimulus for entrepreneurial activities and 
created growth in service and trade industries such as seafood and tourism (Goldsmith, 
1999). The economic stimulus brought about by state oil revenues and the sharing of this 
wealth with the population jump started a previously lackluster and highly cyclical 
economy.  
It should also be noted that the APF dividend has made “the distribution of 
income in Alaska the most equitable in the entire United States…in the last 10 years the 
income of the poorest fifth of Alaskan families has increased 28 percent…compared to 
12 percent for the entire United States.” (Goldsmith, 2002) Additionally, the APF has 
helped to provide a consistent flow of capital to rural and remote areas of the state which 
are considered some of the poorest in the nation.  
4. Socio-Political Impact 
The APF dividend is held as a model of an effective, democratic, transparent, 
well-managed institution. It has provided a modern and workable method to ensure 
common heritage wealth benefits an entire society (Hartzok, 2001). While this may not 
have been by initial design, its general purpose to prevent oil revenues from being 
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quickly used up when received was generally agreed upon, and a broad political spectrum 
of support arose from those concerned with limiting public spending.  
The decision to invest the portfolio in stocks and bonds rather than in state 
projects ensured that APF investment policy became insulated from the vagaries of the 
political arena. The prudent decision to turn over management of the fund to a private 
corporation ensured the fund was headed by a narrowly focused board of directors, 
devoted to maximizing financial returns of the fund. Gradually, the fund acquired a 
powerful constituency, fervently devoted to continuing the annual cash distribution to all 
residents from earnings. This effectively tied political fortunes to the success of the fund 
because many voters supported representatives who favored the continuation of the APF. 
Moreover, it has had the effect of ensuring that Alaska has not had to resort to personal 
income taxes or to increase sales taxes to support government activities. (Goldsmith, 
2002) 
The direct distribution model has proven effective at leading a society to make 
better investment choices and to have a greater incentive to save windfall rents. 
Moreover, this economic incentive appears to engage the public politically resulting in a 
demand for oversight and accountability of institutions that monitor the flow of 
petroleum revenues. (Weinthal and Luong, 2006) 
5. Natural Resource Revenue Distribution Model 
In describing the flow of resources through the APF, an influence diagram is 
helpful (see Figure 7). The arrows represent the direction of influence in this model. The 
line between the economy, the people, and the state represents the sense of ownership 
established Alaskan residents have from the natural resource revenue distribution. The 
ovals symbolize random variables that cannot be controlled directly. The rectangles 
symbolize decision variables or variables that can be controlled directly. Hexagons 
symbolize objective variables (i.e., the variables that are to be maximized). Rectangles 
with rounded corners symbolize deterministic variables (i.e., variables whose values are 
determined by the value of the other variables). 
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a. Oil companies lease oil rights from Alaska, similar to a land lease.  
b. Mineral royalties collected by the state are directly deposited as 
principal to the permanent fund.  
c. The principal portion of the permanent fund, controlled by the APF 
Corporation, is invested in marketable securities. Funds are invested locally and globally.  
d. Earnings from investments go to the earnings reserve portion of the 
permanent fund that can be spent by the state government, with a share of the dividends 
reserved for state residents. Twenty-five percent of the average earnings over the 
previous five years are distributed to residents.  
e. Regardless of the interest earned, money for inflation proofing 
comes from the earnings reserve to protect the principal portion of permanent fund.  
f. Residents typically spend their dividend income predominantly on 
consumer goods, thereby contributing to the Alaskan economy. 
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Figure 7.   Model of Resource Flows Through the APF (After Goldsmith, 2002) 
 
D. NORWAY’S “GOVERNMENT PENSION FUND – GLOBAL” 
1. History 
With the discovery of oil in the North Sea in 1969, Norway’s oil industry has 
grown from a fledgling startup into the world’s seventh largest producer and third largest 
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exporter. (Erikson, 2006) Having steadily increased production throughout the first 20 
years, Norway clearly understood that their natural resource bounty would not be 
everlasting and they set out to establish a permanent fund that would convert oil revenues 
into financial assets. The Petroleum Fund was created in 1990 and has since been 
renamed the Government Pension Fund – Global. The first financial deposits occurred in 
1995 and the fund is now the third largest of its kind with assets currently in excess of 
160 billion Euros ($220 billion dollars). (Englund, 2006) 
2. Key Elements 
Norway’s legislature crafted the fund to maximize long-term returns while 
maintaining the lowest possible risks. To do so, they determined that the fund would 
invest in both debt and equity and the aim was for a three to seven percent rate of real 
return. (Ministry of Finance, 1997) To align interests and generate a protective system of 
checks and balances, policy makers envisioned the fund to be both transparent and 
accountable, designing divisions of responsibilities among the major agencies and 
establishing public reporting requirements. (Erikson, 2006) From the fund’s inception, it 
was determined that it would be collectively owned in lieu of providing for individual 
allotments. Furthermore, the government would not be allowed to borrow from the fund 
nor would there be any spending or lending directly from the fund itself. (Schreiner, 
2004) 
3. Fund Operation 
The fund is professionally managed by the Central bank of Norway, Norges Bank. 
Although the fund is operated by the central bank, the fund’s investment activities are 
conducted by the Norges Bank’s investment branch and kept completely separate from 
both central banking activities and from all other private bank activities. An account is 
established in Norwegian Krones equivalent to the value of the fund’s assets. Oversight is 
provided by the Minister of Finance and audits by the Office of the Auditor General, who 
reports directly to Parliament (see Figure 8). (Erikson, 2006) 
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Deposits into the fund flow only from government budget surpluses. Revenue 
inflow is predominantly from taxes levied on oil production and from the government’s 
stake in the industry. The State budget is created separately by parliament and all 
expenditures are from the budget, not the fund (see Figure 9). An annual cash flow, 
amounting to four percent of the fund’s capital asset base, does flow back to supplement 
the State’s budget. (Erikson, 2006) 
During the fund’s first five years, the Norwegian economy was in recession and 
the government was running large deficits, resulting in the consumption of all oil 
revenues. It was not until 1995 that the government experienced its first budget surplus 
and was able to make the fund’s initial deposit. The fund’s phenomenal growth over the 
last decade has been due to the oil industry’s growth, consistent government budget 
surpluses, and favorable returns on invested capital. (Erikson, 2006) 
4. Strategic Investment Benchmarks 
Norway’s pension fund has very specific guidelines regarding its investment 
strategy and benchmarks. Norway enjoys an extremely stable exchange rate because the 
entirety of the Government Pension Fund is invested globally. The benchmark investment 
debt to equity ratio for the fund is targeted at a 40/60 percent mix. Furthermore, the debt 
portion is geographically diversified, with 45–65% in the European market, 25-45% in 
the Americas, and 0-20% in Asia and Oceana. Equity is similarly distributed with 40-
60% in Europe and 40-60% in the America, Asia, and Oceana (see Figure 10). (Norway 
Ministry of Finance, 1997) 
5. Economic Effects 
One of the major problems with a resource dependent economy is that spending 
rises and falls with commodity cycles and the irregular cash flow of the resource 
industry. However, Norway has been able to successfully parlay their resource windfall 
into an economic shock absorber. As a consequence Norwegians have enjoyed many 
benefits including high per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP), low unemployment, 
low inflation, and strong consumer spending. (Gross, 2004) 
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Although Norway’s oil fund can be largely considered a success, the country was 
by all respects a stable society with well established government and social institutions, 
prior to the discovery of oil in the region. Yet despite all the benefits of having a stable 
society and economy, several issues present problems for the future. The absence of a 
large vibrant high tech industry, the relatively low amount of growth in their non-oil 
export industries, and the relatively small foreign direct investment into the Norwegian 
economy all pose a considerable problem in the long run, once the oil does run dry. 
(Gross, 2004) 
Figure 8 depicts the inter-relationships that exist between Norway’s governing 
institutions with regard to the management of the Government Pension Fund - Global.  
 
A) The Norwegian Parliament develops the governing policies affecting the 
fund. 
B) The Ministry of Finance is responsible for ensuring the fund follows the 
regulations developed by the Parliament and reports back to parliament.  
C) Parliament also specifies that the Auditor General is responsible for the 
auditing and oversight of the Finance Ministry and the Norges Bank.  
D)  Norges Bank is the central bank of Norway, but it is a completely 
separate investment branch which manages the day-to-day operations of the pension 
fund. This branch fall under the controls of the Ministry of Finance and regularly reports 
to them. 
E) As one additional security measure the Ministry of Finance has hired a 
private firm to assist with advice on the management and auditing of pension fund assets. 
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Figure 9 shows the flow of funds between the pension fund and the government 
budget. 
 
A) Petroleum revenues are generated on a continual basis and act as income 
with respect to the Parliament’s budgeting process. 
B) The budgeting process takes place separately and once coupled with the 
revenue figures, funds are transferred to the pension fund if there is a budget surplus. If 
there is a deficit no money flows into the pension fund.  
C) Meanwhile previous surpluses already transferred to the pension fund 
from previous years continue to realize investment income and contribute to the growth 
of the pension fund. 
D) A partial withdrawal from the fund occurs to cover existing pensions paid 













Figure 10 depicts the investment strategy for the fund as mandated by policy. 
 
A) The benchmark investment debt to equity ratio for the fund is targeted at a 
40/60 percent mix.  
B) Furthermore, the debt portion is geographically diversified, with 45–65% 
in the European market, 25-45% in the Americas, and 0-20% in Asia and Oceana.  
C) Equity is similarly distributed with 40-60% in Europe and 40-60% in the 









E. CHAD’S WORLD BANK MODEL 
1. History 
Since its independence in 1960, Chad has been constantly plagued by civil strife, 
political corruption, and violence. It’s social and economic development has been 
stymied by perpetual rebellion, troublesome neighbors, ethnic fighting, and war 
(Rosenblum, 2000). Completely landlocked and one of the poorest nations in the world, 
Chad’s predominantly arid terrain and grossly inadequate infrastructure ranks them 165th 
out of 174 on the United Nations Human Development Indicator (Levy, 2002). Even with 
the discovery of oil in the early 1970s, it has taken over 30 years to establish sufficient 
political stability and foreign investment to begin extraction efforts (Guyer, 2002). 
2. The World Bank 
In 1995, the World Bank was recruited to develop a program which could assist 
Chad in overcoming several obstacles affecting its ability to develop an oil industry. The 
benefits of World Bank involvement include not only project funding, but also revenue 
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management assistance, environmental and social oversight, and most importantly 
reduced risk perceptions (Rosenblum, 2000).  
For World Bank involvement, Chad had to agree to a mandatory anti-corruption 
action plans and good governance initiatives prescribed by the World Bank under its 
Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative. More specifically, the HIPC called for 
Chad to hold multi-party elections, improve its judicial system, appoint an auditor 
general, and pass major anti-corruption and program transparency laws (Kabemba, 2003). 
The development of an environmental management plan was initiated to protect against 
environmental catastrophe, to develop an oil spill response capability, and to hire an 
environmental monitoring firm. Social aspects of the plan prescribe compensation to 
Chadian citizens who were forced to relocate, safe working conditions and good wages 
for local workers, as well as safety and health education programs (Guyer, 2002). 
The “Petroleum Revenue Management Program” was created for the purpose of 
combating poverty and creating transparency in the allocation of oil revenues. The 
Chadian parliament passed a revenue management law which describes the government’s 
poverty reduction goals and calls for nearly 80 percent of the Chadian government’s 
portion of the revenues to go toward education, health, infrastructure, social, and rural 
development programs (Williams, 2001).  
3. How it Works 
The diagram illustrates how resources flow through the system as they are 
developed, collected, managed, and, ultimately, distributed to the recipients (See Figure 
11). 
a. Net income from dividends and royalties are deposited in an 
offshore escrow account. The offshore accounts ensure proper accounting and auditing. 
b. The net income is then allocated to several different accounts: 
1. 10 percent goes to a “Future Generations Fund.” 
2. 4.5 percent goes toward the development of the Doba Basin 
where the majority of Chad’s oil is derived. 
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3. 13.5 percent goes to the government treasury. 
4. 72 percent goes toward rural development, education, 
environment, health, social and infrastructure programs. (Mobbs, 2003) 
A monitoring board is charged with the responsibility of approving account 
activity and ensuring disbursements meet prescribed requirements. The nine board 
members are composed of four from civil society, one representative each from an NGO, 
trade union representative, religious leader, human rights association, and a parliamentary 
member from an opposition party (Eifert, 2002).  
Transparency is ensured through the institution of extensive auditing and 
reporting of the petroleum accounts budget allocation review process involving civil 
society and the government. The findings and reports are then published annually to the 
public (Guyer, 2002). 
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Figure 11.   Model of Resource Flows Through the Chad Government (After Eifert, 2002, 
and Mobbs 2003) 
  
4. Economic Effects 
Thirty years after discovery, the exportation of oil finally began in 2004. With 
annual oil revenues now contributing over 50 percent of Chad’s GDP and after extensive 
World Bank planning, expectations are running high for serious social improvements to 
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take effect. Although it may be too early to pass judgment on the success or failure of 
Chad and the World Bank’s project, some critics claim that little benefit has been derived 
from the oil revenues thus far.  
Chad’s own oil revenue management law dictates baseline fund levels for priority 
sector expenditures (e.g., capital investments). These baseline targets are supposed to 
increase in proportion with any increase in revenues; however, this has not been the case. 
Instead, programs defined by law as non-priority (mostly defense spending) have 
received excessive funding increases. This may explain the reason for the real or 
perceived notion that the country has not yet seen a benefit from generous oil revenues. 
(Gary & Reisch, 2005) 
Aside from “putting huge profits into a few well-connected hands...little if any 
revenue has benefited the country” (Garcia, 2007). Moreover, in January 2006, the World 
Bank suspended $124 million in loans and stopped disbursement of $125 million in oil 
royalties because of the government’s failure to live up to the project conditions. Chad’s 
president not only threatened to shut down oil production, but “demanded over $100 
million from Exxon Mobile to tide the country over until the World Bank released Chad’s 
royalties.” (Garcia, 2007)  
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VII. AN ANALYSIS OF THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF 
ALTERNATIVE RESOURCE DISTRIBUTION MECHANISMS 
After having briefly described several models used to distribute national resources 
to citizens, an analysis of the benefits and costs of alternative revenue sharing schemes is 
performed to explore options that might be available to the Iraqi government. In this way, 
the features most desirable in a model for revenue sharing in Iraq may be identified and 
presented for consideration. The models that will be analyzed include those referenced in 
figures 5 through 7, 11, and 13. These influence diagrams include those of the central 
government controlled by Saddam Hussein (Figure 5), and the proposed draft legislation 
currently in deliberation by the parliament of the Republic of Iraq (Figure 6), the state of 
Alaska (Figure 7), and the nations of Norway (Figure 8-10), and Chad (Figure 11). These 
diagrams illustrate how resources flow through the system as they are developed, 
collected, managed, and, ultimately, distributed to the recipients.  
This project has one primary goal: to explore the benefits and costs of alternative 
approaches that would guarantee private Iraqi ownership of that nation’s oil wealth. This 
relates back to the principal-agent problem discussed in chapter IV. The principal-agent 
problem in Iraq revolves around the fact the U.S. (the principal) wants to extricate itself 
from the occupation of Iraq, but only under conditions that ensure stability and economic 
opportunity for Iraqi citizens. The ideal for the U.S. would be to find a solution to the 
Principal-Agent problem that motivates individual Iraqi citizens (the agents) to choose 
for themselves behavior that will foster greater security and stability for their families and 
for the future of their country. 
The study has two underlying hypotheses: First, through private ownership, 
individual Iraqis will have an incentive to preserve the value of their shares, resulting in a 
strong financial interest and demand for security. Second by allowing every Iraqi the 
ability to sell some or all of their shares, and/or to receive dividends from an oil fund, 
financing will be made available for entrepreneurial efforts. Given an adequate 
macroeconomic and institutional environment, this could have the effect of stimulating 
the Iraqi economy unleashing the entrepreneurial spirit of the Iraqi people, boosting 
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economic development, and creating even greater demand for stability by individual Iraqi 
citizens. Further allowing the accumulation of shares has the potential to build powerful 
ownership interests that will insist on the protection and efficient management and 
operation of Iraq’s oil infrastructure. 
The two primary criteria used to evaluate the respective revenue sharing models 
are related to two fundamental questions: (1) does the population benefit from the 
distribution of resource wealth in such a way that it encourages investment and economic 
development? And (2) does the model encourage the people to contribute to the security 
and stability of the nation? While the first criterion is more common in the stabilization 
and reconstruction literature, the second is critically important in Iraq.  
A. THE AUTOCRATIC CENTRAL GOVERNMENT MODEL UNDER 
SADDAM HUSSEIN 
1.  Benefits 
The central government model has some advantages, but many more 
disadvantages (see Table 2). One of the advantages is that the decision making process is 
simple, especially in a central government that is autocratic. Under Saddam Hussein for 
example, the governing body was effectively a single individual, advised only by close 
family members, without any further checks and balances. In this model, the dictator can 
make sweeping changes, edicts, and may dismantle or construct favorable legislative and 
judicial bodies at his or her whim. This has the effect of the government using the 
country’s oil wealth to respond to perceived threats to the regime’s power, to engage with 







Table 2.   Benefits and Costs of the Autocratic Central Government Model  
BENEFITS COSTS 
Streamlined decision making Easily Corruptible 
Responsive People lack a voice in decision making 
Reactive Economic and Social Standing determined by 
     the government 
 Discrimination 




Despite the benefit of streamlined decision-making, an autocratic government is 
easily corruptible, as was the government of Saddam Hussein. The public’s wealth is 
treated like the personal wealth of the ruler and his family members, and is used to buy 
support and protection. This is often seen in countries affected by the “resource curse,” or 
nations which fare poorly because their immense resources are squandered or put to ill 
use. Discrimination can also become government policy. For example, Saddam Hussein’s 
Sunni minority Baath party decided who had standing in society and who did not.  
Unilateral decisions are made under autocratic governments without the constraint 
of public support. Saddam spent billions on the 1980 to 1988 war with neighboring Iran 
and nearly bankrupted the country. Those who objected to the government’s policies or to 
Saddam Hussein quietly disappeared or were jailed, often indefinitely. 
Increased dependency of the population on the “benevolence” of the ruler tends to 
break down individual initiative and undermines the benefits of trade and exchange. The 
government’s subsidized public distribution system provided many of the things required 
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by the people to survive, such as food, fuel, utilities, and a sweeping public-employee 
pension system (Jane’s: Economics, 2007). These subsidies, though appearing 
benevolent, had the effect of discouraging the labor supply and caused many of the 
economic distortions associated with price controls. In sum, though some wealth was 
distributed to the people (the first goal), the only ways in which security and stability was 
encouraged was through oppressive tactics. The central government model under Saddam 
Hussein has many lessons for the present government of Iraq, but most are negative. 
B. THE CURRENT (DRAFT) HYDROCARBON LEGISLATION 
1. Benefits 
The current draft hydrocarbon law being debated in Iraq’s parliament offers a 
more hopeful option for the distribution of Iraq’s oil wealth. However, given its many 
vague elements, it is not yet clear whether it will be approved and, if approved, if it will 
distribute wealth to the people and significantly contribute to a stable and secure Iraq (see 
Table 3). 
One of the benefits of the draft law model is that control and distribution of oil 
receipts is centralized, but controls over the factors of production are not. This means that 
the central government collects and distributes oil wealth, but if it abuses its power or 
does not act according to the will of the powerful regions and provinces, the regions can 
simply turn off the pumps. In general, this idea seems positive, but it does offer room for 
conflict, which will be addressed in the cost portion of this discussion. The Iraqi National 
Oil Company (INOC) has been designated the responsibility to administer Iraq’s oil 
infrastructure and to export refined products, while the regions coordinate and form 
contracts with foreign oil companies, subject to approval by the central government.  
These checks and balances are important in preventing the monopoly of power by 
a single faction of government and to prevent corruption. Furthermore, the people can 
now vote for their chosen representatives who, in their view, would vote favorably for the 
things they value the most. It is the ultimate hope of the Iraqi people (and, for that matter, 
the world) that Iraq will eventually be free of the kinds of sectarian and factional 
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differences that interfere with its political processes, and that the economy will rebound 
to provide the goods and services the people desperately need. 
 
Table 3.   Benefits and Costs of the Draft Hydrocarbon Legislation Model 
BENEFITS COSTS 
Centralized control of oil receipts Vaguely defined – multiple interpretations 
Equitable distribution of wealth Potential central/regional government conflict 
Decentralized control of oil production 
System of checks and balances 
Central control of oil receipts may provide 
     incentives for a coup 
People have elected representatives Draft law does not address: 





     Inefficiencies in labor markets 
Security/stability incentives not clear: 
     Individual citizens do not have an obvious 
     stake that might encourage joint national  
     interests to preserve security and launch 
     reconstruction 
 
2. Costs 
The main limitation of the draft law is that its provisions for wealth distribution 
are vaguely defined and are open to multiple interpretations by the elected government of 
Iraq, many of whom have very different opinions about how its oil wealth should be 
divided. The Kurds in the north believe the central government should allow 58 percent 
control of oil revenues to reside with the INOC and, thus, be more subject to control by 
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the regions. In response, the central government of Iraq has threatened to blacklist oil 
companies doing business with the Kurds. The country’s minority, the Sunnis, believe the 
draft law is the latest example of a conspiracy to break the country into its three regional 
contingents: the Kurds in the oil rich north, the similarly rich Shi’a in the south, and the 
Sunnis in central Iraq with virtually no oil resources (The Economist, September 30, 
2006). 
Another limitation of the draft oil law is that it does not address the excessive and 
unsustainable subsidies provided to Iraqi citizens, or the fundamental inefficiencies that 
exist in the labor markets. These factors are important because no model for distribution 
of the oil wealth in Iraq will be successful if these problems are not addressed. 
The intention of the draft law is for equitable wealth distribution for all Iraqis. 
The draft law model offers vague provisions that focus on government control of oil 
receipts, but do not provide the population with a direct and visible stake in the 
distribution process. Because of this, it does not yet support the goal of this project to 
offer a path for Iraqis to guarantee their own security by ensuring each Iraqi citizen has a 
stake in Iraq’s oil wealth.  
C. THE ALASKA PERMANENT FUND (APF) MODEL 
1. Benefits 
The Alaskan model used to manage oil revenues has several advantages and few 
disadvantages. Beginning with the very reason for the fund’s creation, the APF created a 
renewable resource (cash) out of a non-renewable natural resource (oil). Revenues 
generated by the fund have revitalized a once-sluggish economy and eliminated the need 
for personal income and sales taxes. Citizens also gain monetarily from this distribution 
of wealth through annual dividends, leading to several social and political benefits 
directly attributable to the fund (see Table 4) 
Alaska’s dividend program spurs public involvement and creates a strong demand 
for representative government. The fund drives a powerful constituency devoted to 
continuing annual earning distributions to residents and contributes to an effective 
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democratic, transparent, and well-managed wealth distribution model. Furthermore, it 
limits government-spending, preventing oil revenues from being spent too quickly, and 
serves as a means of checks and balances. Finally, with the many benefits provided 
citizens by this model, there is a built-in motivation to make the best use of oil assets to 
ensure future gains. 
In designing the Alaska permanent fund, great care was taken to ensure growth of 
the principal and to provide stability in the investments. Built-in inflation protection 
programs ensure the fund will continue to provide for future needs of the state and the 
population. Distributions from the fund are based on percentages that ensure preservation 
of the principal. By setting expenditures based on a moving average, short-term political 
and economic volatility is diminished while stabilizing the distribution of assets from 
year to year. This stability provides the government opportunities not afforded other 
states in that revenues are predictable and make budgeting more reliable.  
The fund is diversified by design and gains are not solely tied to the state of 
Alaska. The decision to invest the portfolio in stocks and bonds rather than in state 
projects ensures fund investments are insulated from any negative effects from the local 
political arena. This is important since the state receives over four-fifths of its annual 
revenue from oil while the industry itself only employs a small fraction of the population. 
It would also provide, if necessary, the ability for prompt payment of any government 
debt, though Alaska has not had to deal with that scenario.  
There are also benefits to the Alaska model that may not have been intended at its 
inception but that could prove valuable in Iraq. First, citizens must gain standing to 
benefit from the fund. In Alaska, this simply requires demonstrating residency and an 
intent to remain a resident. In Iraq, it could serve as means to document its citizens by 
issuing identification cards or even obtaining fingerprint records as a way to gain 
standing. Second, Alaska withholds payments to persons who have been involved in legal 
troubles or have judgments against them. For Iraq it could serve as motivation to not be 




dividends in college funds that have become a popular option for those with children. 
Iraq could offer similar education alternatives or even provide voucher credits to be used 
in a privatization effort. 
 
Table 4.   Benefits and Costs of the Alaska Model 
BENEFITS COSTS 
Population gains from wealth distribution 
Population has stake in security 
Creates political distortions 
Creates dependency on oil wealth 
Creates demand for representative government 
Turns non-renewable oil into renewable cash resource 
May encourage consumption over 
     investment 
Can be used to pay down debt  
Lowers or eliminates taxes  
Can account for inflation  




Many of the criticisms of the Alaska model involve differing opinions on how 
best to manage income generated from the fund. There will always be questions as to 
whether funds could have been better spent through other means. One consistent criticism 
is based on dealing with the powerful political constituency that is devoted to the fund. 
Many feel that this single political issue is too big an influence and that other important 
areas of government may be overlooked. Potential does exist for the views of citizens to 
become distorted when the number one issue deals with their pocketbook. It could also 
influence how the population interacts or interfaces with (and could unfairly drive 
expectations of) the government. 
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When considering our primary goal, this model does offer a realistic way to 
distribute natural resource wealth to the population. Dividend payments would provide 
instant gratification, demonstrating to citizens the benefits of the program. If the 
population of Iraq adopts a model like this and people understand the correlation between 
their personal finances and success of the program, then the example of Alaska suggests 
there should be a greater desire for people to get involved to increase security and 
stability and protect the system. 
D. THE NORWEGIAN MODEL 
Norway has been successful at avoiding the “Dutch disease,” otherwise known as 
the “natural resource curse,” which has afflicted many resource rich regions around the 
world. One of the primary reasons for their success has much to do with the development 
of the Government Pension Fund – Global. As a model, this fund possesses several 
positive characteristics and a few negatives. 
1. Benefits 
As previously discussed, the Norwegian model was principally designed to 
transform non-renewable natural resources and the revenues those resources generated 
into long term financial assets which would benefit many future generations of 
Norwegians. The Norwegian government understood the limits of their known oil 
reserves and that they would likely be depleted over the course of the century. To counter 
the eventual loss of these resources the government developed an economic model which 
would allow them to maximize their benefits for many years beyond the depletion of their 
known oil reserves (see Table 5). 
Another positive characteristic of the Norwegian model is the incredible asset 
growth which has resulted from the operation of this model. Since its initial deposit in 
1995, the fund has grown to well over 220 billion dollars worth of assets in a relatively 
short period of time. Although this performance cannot be guaranteed into the future, the 
rising price of oil and a sensible investing plan promise to keep this fund growing at a 
significant pace for several years to come.  
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Although the Norwegian fund does not provide an annual stipend to every citizen, 
the population does gain from the distribution of wealth. Designed specifically as a 
pension fund, distributions are made to retirees and as supplemental income to those 
unable to work. The fund is an entitlement for every Norwegian citizen, but 
predominantly benefits those in the latter stages of life. The fund provides a significant 
social economic safety net. 
This model also benefits greatly from having a soundly structured investment 
strategy which to date has provided strong and stable growth of the fund’s financial 
assets. Furthermore, by investing globally the fund has contributed to a stable currency 
and low inflation.  
Table 5.   Benefits and Costs of the Norwegian Model 
BENEFITS COSTS 
Converts natural resources into long term 
     financial resources 
Careful growth of financial assets 
Population gains from wealth distribution 
Does not strongly promote innovation and 
     investment in the rest of the economy.  
Does not directly impact population’s desires 
     for increased security and stability 
Provides for a social safety net  





With all its benefits, the Norwegian model does have some inherent drawbacks. 
First of all, Norway has not been able to develop a robust manufacturing sector. Much 
like the U.S., Norway’s economy and workforce continues to revolve around strong 
service sector and presents more of a consumer market than an export market. Norway’s 
primary export is crude oil, yet this industry is not labor intensive and employs only a 
small fraction of the population. The focus on Norway’s oil industry may be contributing 
to the lack of innovation in the manufacturing sector. 
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A problem with the Norwegian model for Iraq is that since monetary 
disbursements are not distributed to all citizens each year, this model would not directly 
impact the population’s desires for increased security and stability. This model provides 
for an indirect benefit in the years to come for many citizens but it does not provide direct 
benefit to all citizens in the present. This has not been a problem for the Norwegians 
because they have for many years had a relatively homogeneous population with strong 
well established government and social institutions. This cannot be said for many other 
resource rich regions.  
In sum, this model does achieve the goal of ensuring that the population gains 
from the distribution of wealth, but because the gain is relatively indirect. in that it 
provides those gains in the form of social programs and future pensions, it does not 
strongly support the objective of creating a system under which the current population of 
Iraq would want to establish security and stability in order to defend the region. 
E. THE CHADIAN MODEL 
Unlike the Norwegian and Alaskan models which were developed to operate in 
well established and stable societies with functioning social institutions, the Chadian 
model was developed by the World Bank for an unstable environment. Due to this 
specific focus in the development of the Chadian model, it offers several benefits for 
developing nations with natural resources. However, despite many built-in checks and 
balances, the Chadian model does have its drawbacks. 
1. Benefits 
The most obvious benefit of this model for Iraq is that it was designed specifically 
to operate in an unstable environment. This is accomplished by making it more attractive 
for foreign investment through risk reduction measures. The World Bank’s involvement 
alone has given the program a sense of legitimacy, but it is the strict governance and 
oversight which reduces the inherent risks involved in developing the infrastructure 
required to create a functioning economy. For Chad’s government to reap the benefits 
 80
from the sale of their natural resources, they must invest in infrastructure, pass anti-
corruption legislation, and make social reforms (see Table 6). 
The model also calls for a significant investment to improve the quality of life for 
the population at large. Approximately 72 percent of all revenues are mandated to be 
used to address social and infrastructure improvements. This includes investments in 
education programs, health care institutions, the development of roads and improvements 
in agriculture. Furthermore, offshore management of the oil income creates a mechanism 
to prevent Chad’s government from reneging on its agreements with the World Bank and 
foreign investors. Other mandatory requirements by the World Bank focus on 
government reforms including anti-corruption laws, the development of a strong judicial 
system, the rule of law, and multi-party elections to ensure equitable representation of all 
the people of Chad. 
Lastly, program oversight and transparency is designed into the model. In 
addition to the oversight provided by the World Bank, several NGOs are involved in the 
development of social programs and environmental protection. The offshore management 
of oil revenues is overseen by a nine member board that does not have direct ties to the 
ruling majority in Chad’s government. Transparency is provided to the public through 








Table 6.   Benefits and Costs of the Chadian Model 
BENEFITS COSTS 
Promotes foreign investment Not corruption proof 
Provides anti-corruption measures Unproven results and track record 
Designed for unstable governments Does not guarantee stability 
Built-in oversight and transparency. 
Requires: 
     Multi-party election and judicial 
          reforms 
     Significant social and infrastructure 
          reforms 
No evidence population actually benefits from 
     reforms 
Not clear that individuals have the incentive to 
     preserve security or the means to promote 




One of the drawbacks to the Chadian model is that it is not impervious to 
corruption. As previously discussed, Chad’s government responded to the withholding of 
oil revenues for its failure to comply with all of the World Bank’s requirements. It did so 
by issuing threats to shut down oil facilities and blackmailing oil companies, to apply 
pressure on the World Bank to release the withheld funds. Another problem is that this 
model does not necessarily promote stability. Although reforms are mandated, shifts in 
political power to control those oil revenue fueled reforms still pose some underlying 
risks. Moreover, this model is relatively new and has yet to generate proven results.  
When considering our primary goal, this model does appear to distribute Chad’s 
natural resource wealth for the benefit of the population. However, that wealth 
distribution is not in the form of monetary disbursements, but in the form of government 
controlled social reforms. It is not clear that this would motivate the population to 
increase security and stability. 
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VIII. FILLING THE GAPS IN THE DRAFT OIL LAW 
While some degree of description and evaluation has previously been provided 
regarding the draft hydrocarbon legislation that is currently being debated in Iraq’s 
parliament, it deserves further analysis. The reason why this is important is that a 
significant portion of the draft oil law is presently being debated for passage into formal 
Iraqi law. Therefore, it seems likely that without the identification of a pressing need, the 
Iraqi parliament will “stay the course.” The following provides some justification for why 
certain changes may be beneficial. 
The “draft oil law” provides for the distribution of oil revenues and defines the 
rights of foreign investors. Our review of this law consists of five parts. First the analysis 
expands on what was discussed in section VII.B providing some additional background 
of the draft oil law. Second, an illustration of its principal components and a statement of 
their respective statuses will be presented. Third, a discussion of the current state of the 
legislation will be provided. This discussion relies on several prominent documents 
available in the peer-reviewed literature and mainstream media. Fourth, our study of 
alternative strategies for the management of an Iraqi oil fund illustrates two key findings: 
1) the Iraqi draft oil law could be strengthened through the use of exogenous oversight 
and financial management assistance; and 2) improvements can be made to the way 
resources are managed and ultimately distributed to the Iraqi people. Finally, this 
discussion leads to some conclusions and general recommendations that should be of use 
to U.S. and Iraqi policy makers and other countries struggling to make the best use of 
their national wealth. 
A. ANALYSIS OF THE DRAFT OIL LAW 
1. The Components 
The four components of the proposed draft oil law are: (1) a hydrocarbon 
framework (oil and gas), (2) financial resources (revenue-sharing), (3) restructuring the  
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ministry of oil, and (4) establishing the Iraq National Oil Company (INOC). Figure 12 
shows the status of the four pieces of the proposed hydrocarbon legislation as of 1 July 
2007. 
 
Figure 12.   Status of Iraq’s Hydrocarbon Legislation as of July 1, 2007 (From GAO, July 
17, 2007) 
 
In order for the legislation to be enacted into law, it must first be submitted to 
Iraq’s Council of Ministers, which is Iraq’s cabinet. It must also be vetted by the Shura 
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council, which is a committee responsible for ensuring constitutionality and managing 
reconciliation between Iraqi and Islamic law. It then must be presented to Iraq’s 
parliament, the Council of Representatives. Once laws are passed, they are made 
available to the public via Iraq’s official publication known as the Official Gazette. 
(GAO, July 17, 2007). 
Only the umbrella legislation, which lays out the structure, management, and 
oversight of Iraq’s oil industry, exists in any substantial form. Revenue-sharing 
provisions of the draft oil law have been preliminarily agreed to, but have not been 
submitted to the cabinet for approval. Moreover, none of the literature available speaks to 
what might be in those provisions. The other two components, restructuring the Ministry 
of Oil and the reconstitution of the Iraqi National Oil Company, have not been written 
yet. The first piece, draft oil law framework, was first approved on February 26, 2007. In 
July of that year the cabinet gave approval for submission to its parliament, where it sits 
today. (GAO, July 17, 2007). 
2. Constitutional Issues 
The draft oil law currently being debated in Iraq’s parliament builds upon the 
Iraqi Constitution that was enacted into law on 15 October 2005. The most applicable 
sections of the constitution pertaining to the draft oil law are sections 110 through 115. 
These sections are in great dispute due to vague elements that are interpreted in different 
ways by the various interested parties. They concern responsibility of the central 
government, regional governments, and define ownership of shared and exclusive 
jurisdictions and hydrocarbon assets. (Republic of Iraq, 2005) 
Section 111 of the constitution states that, “Oil and gas are owned by all the 
people of Iraq in all the regions and governorates.” (Republic of Iraq, 2005) This has led 
to the interpretation by the Kurdistan Regional Government that the regional 
governments are in ownership of hydrocarbon resources (Shafiq, 2006, as cited by 
Mahdi, 2007), with no mention of equal and joint ownership of these assets by the Iraqi 
people. 
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Article 112 of the constitution says the central government has prime 
responsibility for the management of “present” oil fields. However, there is dispute 
whether Article 115 applies to oil and gas, which states that powers not specifically 
granted to the central government reside with the regional governments. Moreover, it has 
been argued that the term “present” refers to existing and producing oil fields, not to 
those which are known to exist but not yet producing, nor fields which are not yet known. 
According to Mahdi (2007), 
In essence, many politicians engaged in backroom bargaining are 
ultimately embroiled in a resource conflict—rather than a conflict of ideas 
and visions. What has been lost is even a minimal sense of a common 
national interest, or for that matter any sense of what are the “communal” 
interests. 
With widespread individual ownership of oil revenues (through ownership shares 
or an oil fund) could come a common bond and national interest in the preservation and 
development of security and the reconstruction of Iraq. Unfortunately, the issues in the 
draft oil law are greatly confounded by the vague language in the constitution, but they 
are also a result of political realities. When the constitution was written, hastily and 
without much public discourse, it favored too heavily the regions, driven primarily by 
their participation in the political process. The Sunnis, once the party of primary 
dominance under the old Baath regime, had at first sought to boycott the process. The oil-
rich Kurds in the north and similarly rich Shi’a in the south fought for representation 
within the government to protect their interests. But oil does not fit neatly within the 
confines of the borders of the 18 regional governorates in Iraq (Mahdi, 2007). 
Based upon the language in the constitution, the basic construction of the draft oil 
process would leave the regional governments with the majority of the power to contract 
with foreign oil companies, subject to approval from the central government. This creates 
a strong incentive for an adversarial relationship. Under the proposed system, which 
would distribute receipts on a per-capita basis, distortions would exist along factional 
lines. The Sunni minority population is concerned that it would receive a diminished 
share of oil revenue. Herein lies the potential for discontent and incentive for a 
continuation of the violence seen to date. 
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Further complicating the matter, Iraq has lost much of its expertise due to 
previous wars and economic sanctions placed on Saddam Hussein’s regime. As a result, 
the regional governments do not possess sufficient managerial and technical competence 
to manage the complicated contracts required of long-run relationships with foreign oil 
companies. Contract terms, especially in operating climates of uncertain stability and 
security, would likely favor the oil companies. Without a consolidated economic policy 
designed to ensure adequate long-term outcomes for the benefit of the Iraqi people, the 
oil companies will be able to pit the regions against each other, negotiating only those 
contracts most favorable to them. (Mahdi, 2007) 
In addition, devolving control over the oil contracts to local governments and 
opening the oil sector to unregulated foreign investment would not lead to increased 
transparency. Rather, the creation of multiple competing jurisdictions could lead to more 
corruption, graft, and outright theft of oil products. Pooling resources nationally could be 
more efficient and might also increase the public’s ability to assess the policy and see 
where the country’s resources are actually going. (Mahdi, 2007) However, centralized 
power and control of oil resources presents its own dangers discussed earlier. The 
solution suggested in this thesis is to distribute ownership shares and/or oil revenues 
directly to the Iraqi people. 
Lately, the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) has been putting the vague 
language that exists in the draft oil law to the test, and has begun signing foreign oil 
companies to exploration contracts. A compromise had been worked out in February 
2007, wherein a powerful Federal Oil and Gas Council (FOGC) would manage national 
production and development policy. The FOGC, chaired by the prime minister, would 
have final approval over regional contracts. The regional authorities would be responsible 
for specific negotiations and development planning. However, since then the KRG passed 
its own oil law stipulating their regional authority and contracts signed under it. They 
began negotiating specific contracts with companies such as the U.S.’ Hunt Oil in early 
September 2007. The FOGC has since ruled the law illegal and has stated the move 
amounts to a virtual attempt at secession by the KRG. (EIU, 2007) 
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B. ALTERNATIVE MODELS FOR OIL FUND MANAGEMENT 
1. Post-Invasion Oil Policy 
Many ideas have been offered about the best use in Iraq for its vast oil revenues. 
In August 2004, Ayad Allawi, the interim prime minister (essentially a U.S. appointee at 
that time) appointed Barham Saleh, previously his Kurdish nationalist deputy, as the 
leader of the Supreme Council for Oil Policy. The main parameters of the Allawi 
government, which remain as general guiding principles today (in spite of the draft oil 
law), are, according to Mahdi (2007): 
The need to divorce government from running the oil industry and to 
commercialize its operations, leading to the application of strict 
financial constraints on the national industry and the setting of 
ambitious performance targets that are expected to drive the industry 
towards partnership with major international oil companies. 
The separation of presently utilized oil resources and existing 
operations from unexploited proven oil and gas reserves, making 
future development and production the domain of the private sector, 
particularly foreign companies, with or without Iraqi partners. 
Rapid growth of crude oil output levels with simultaneous plans to 
restore existing capacity and double it within seven years. 
Gradual privatization of wholesale and retail petroleum products, and 
distribution and service activities, with future refinery expansion left to 
the private sector and foreign companies. 
While it does not seem altogether palatable (politically or practically) to say, 
“…with or without Iraqi partners,” there is a general theme of reduced government 
intervention and strong overtones of privatization in these suggestions. However, like the 
draft oil law, Mr. Saleh’s ideas did not solve the principal-agent problem that exists in 
Iraq because it ignores the importance of economic incentives for individual Iraqis. 
Consequently, the people feel no vested interest in seeing the government succeed. 
Rather, factional and sectarian loyalties, disenchantment, and competing interests are 
allowed to flourish. 
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This project previously compared several alternative models applying a 
qualitative benefit-cost analysis that illustrated how other nations have handled the 
distribution of their national wealth. However, to propose similar ideas that might 
motivate Iraqis to vie for their own security and stability suggests looking at some of the 
specific implementation options that have been suggested by others for the nation of Iraq. 
The next section of this paper will look at the International Citizens Trust (ICT) approach 
to Iraq and The International Compact with Iraq. Finally, the thesis concludes with some 
specific recommendations and a description of general implementation issues that must 
be considered by any policy maker working in this area.  
2. International Citizens Trust (ICT) 
The International Citizens Trust, or ICT, is a proposal put forward by Michael E. 
Bond, former member of the U.S. Navy’s UDT/SEAL team and president of Quantex 
Corporation until 2002. The ICT focuses on the creation of electronic accounts for each 
Iraqi citizen wishing to participate in a revenue-sharing program, who lives within the 
confines of Iraq. Every citizen, regardless of race, age, gender, or ethnicity, would be 
allowed to participate. (Bond, 2007) 
The registration of citizens serves a dual purpose: it may both be used as an 
official census, essential for participation in a revenue distribution program, and as the 
documentation necessary for creating individual trust accounts for citizens. Foreign 
corporations doing business within the confines of Iraq would be required to create shares 
of dividend-paying stock in each newly created corporate entity. This would result in 
monies entering the system through their mandatory participation, which is automatically 
paid into shareholders’ trust accounts. Local companies would be provided the 
opportunity to register to take payments from individual trust accounts. Consequently, 
individual citizens would be allowed the use of these electronic accounts, which would 
provide them personal liquidity. This injection of capital would have the immediate effect 
of fueling the Iraqi economy through the creation of personal wealth for investment and 
an “ability to spend.” The additional demand for products would spur not only local 
market growth, but also that of the region. (Bond, 2007) 
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This program purports to have a number of primary effects. First, it would serve 
as an incentive for displaced citizens who fled the country to return. This would inject 
skilled labor helping correct one of the fundamental deficiencies that currently exists in 
the labor market. Second, the government would receive a one percent fee on every 
transaction so it would not need to rely on proceeds from oil or a personal income or 
consumption tax to fuel the government. As a result it would reduce corruption because 
government officials would have no choice but to accept the increased transparency that 
would accompany a system of electronic transfers of wealth. Third, standing in the 
revenue distribution program would be easily and readily obtained by each citizen who 
chose to live within the country and participate in the program. Fourth, it would provide a 
means for privatization for all public services, to include public utilities and healthcare. 
Fifth, it would greatly reduce the impact the shadow economy has on the country due to 
increased electronic payments for a vast majority of goods and services within the 
economy. Sixth, it would require oversight by an independent and international non-
governmental organization, which would also encourage transparency and accountability. 
Seventh, it would limit the influence of spoilers and regional governments’ abilities to 
extract value from the Iraqi economy through the sale and trafficking of illicitly obtained 
resources. Finally, it would increase the citizens’ faith in their government by requiring 
checks and balances to its power, a basic and necessary infrastructure that would protect 
the rights of citizens from abuse by the government. (Bond, 2007) 
3. The International Compact with Iraq (ICI) 
The ICI is an initiative of the government of the Republic of Iraq to form a 
partnership with the international community. It is co-chaired by the Government of Iraq 
and the United Nations and is partnered with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
World Bank, and other regional financial institutions. The Compact is a five-year national 
plan that provides benchmarks for reconstruction, national unity, and mutual 
commitments within Compact membership. The goals are to restore peace in Iraq and to 
provide a framework for economic reconstruction and sound governance. (Republic of 
Iraq, 2007) 
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Within the Public Resource Management context of the broad landscape of 
general provisions agreed to within the Compact, are some general but very interesting 
features for oil revenue distribution. It stipulates the Government of Iraq will “establish a 
single petroleum account, to receive revenues from all crude oil and gas sales,” and that 
the account will be transparent and accountable to the people in accordance with its 
constitution. It states the account will be subject to rigorous auditing and monitoring by a 
well-known international authority which will provide published financial statements of 
outputs, exports, payments, and revenue data. Equitable oil revenue distribution is 
supposed to be provided for all Iraqis. One of the most interesting features provided for in 
the compact is, “The Government of Iraq will endorse the EITI principles and commence 
exploratory consultations towards its implementation.” The following will provide a brief 
explanation of the EITI and its roles and responsibilities in helping previous nations-in-
conflict to manage their mineral wealth. (Republic of Iraq, 2007) 
a. Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) 
British Prime Minister Tony Blair introduced the EITI at the World 
Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002. The objective was to encourage those 
nations involved in extractive industries to make public the amounts paid in and out of 
the accounts for natural resources. This was the result of pressure from non-profit 
organizations such as Global Witness, that eventually spread to various governmental 
entities and private companies involved in extraction. (Lee, 2006) 
The EITI supports improved governance in resource-rich countries 
through publication and full disclosure of corporate payments and government revenues 
from oil, gas, and mining operations. It maintains good governance is the key element to 
combating the “resource curse,” by converting large revenues from extractive industries 
into economic growth and the reduction of poverty. This reduces the government’s means 
through which to oppress its population, leading to conflict, poverty, and corruption. In 
its own terms (EITI, 2007), 
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The EITI is a coalition of governments, companies, civil society groups, 
investors and international organizations. It has developed a robust yet 
flexible methodology that ensures a global standard is maintained 
throughout the different implementing countries. The EITI Board and the 
international Secretariat are the guardians of that methodology. 
Implementation itself, however, is the responsibility of individual 
countries. The EITI, in a nutshell, is a globally developed standard that 
promotes revenue transparency at the local level. 
One of the most interesting items the EITI features is that it offers a “clear 
signal to investors that the government is committed to strengthening transparency and 
accountability over natural resource revenues.” It states that companies and citizens can 
help reduce the risk to foreign investors by reducing large-sum, long-term corruption. 
(EITI, 2007) 
The EITI’s International Advisory Group establishes its board and is 
composed of “five constituent groups representing implementing countries, supporting 
countries, civil society organizations, industry, and investment companies.” Dr. Peter 
Eigen, founder of Transparency International, is its chairman. The Board is supported by 
an International Secretariat and a group of full-time staff based in London. A move to 
Oslo, Norway is planned. (EITI, 2007) 
The Board has agreed to accept 15 countries as candidates and will be 
proceeding to implementation. The candidates have two years to establish their full 
compliance. They are: Azerbaijan, Cameroon, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Mongolia, Niger, Nigeria, Peru, and Yemen. 
Seven of the 15 have already published clean audit reports. Nine other countries have 
applications pending, with more information having been requested by the end of 2007. 
Those countries are: Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, 
Madagascar, Republic of Congo, Sao Tome and Principe, Sierra Leone, Trinidad and 
Tobago, and Timor-Leste. Implementation of the EITI requires countries to meet or 




Table 7.   The EITI Critera (From EITI, 2007) 
 
• Regular publication of all material oil, gas and mining payments 
by companies to governments (“payments”) and all material 
revenues received by governments from oil, gas and mining 
companies (“revenues”) to a wide audience in a publicly 
accessible, comprehensive and comprehensible manner. 
• Where such audits do not already exist, payments and revenues 
are the subject of a credible, independent audit, applying 
international auditing standards. 
• Payments and revenues are reconciled by a credible, independent 
administrator, applying international auditing standards and with 
publication of the administrator’s opinion regarding that 
reconciliation including discrepancies, should any be identified. 
• This approach is extended to all companies including state-
owned enterprises. 
• Civil society is actively engaged as a participant in that design, 
monitoring and evaluation of this process and contributes 
towards public debate. 
• A public, financially sustainable work plan for all the above is 
developed by the host government, with assistance from the 
international financial institutions where required, including 
measurable targets, a timetable for Implementation, and an 
















This chapter analyzed one component of the problem of how best to avoid the 
resource curse in Iraq. It primarily focused on some weaknesses in the current Iraqi draft 
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oil law. This analysis was conducted by first reviewing the background of the draft oil 
law and expanding on what was already provided in chapter VII. Second, a discussion of 
its principal components, and a statement of their respective statuses, was shown. Third, a 
discussion of the current state of the legislation was provided. Fourth, our review of 
alternative arrangements to manage an Iraqi oil fund illustrated two key findings: (1) the 
Iraqi draft oil law could be strengthened through the use of exogenous oversight and 
financial management assistance; and (2) improvements could be made to the way 
resources are managed and ultimately distributed to the Iraqi people. This leads to some 
general recommendations that should be of use to U.S. and Iraqi policy makers and other 
countries struggling to make the best use of their national wealth. 
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IX. PROJECT RECOMMENDATIONS 
Instead of offering specific recommendations, this project reveals a general 
framework based on desirable elements of the various models examined, that public 
policy makers can consider when deciding the most appropriate courses of action. In 
addition to the elements that were found to be favorable to the project goal of distributing 
national wealth to a country’s citizens, several implementation issues and constraints 
were identified.  
A.  ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY 
It is clear much needs to be done to allow Iraqi audit agencies greater flexibility to 
investigate and prosecute corruption on the part of governmental officials. Until this is 
done, foreign investment will continue to suffer and theft, corruption, and graft will drain 
the Iraqi economy of a steady stream of revenues and capital investment opportunities. 
Moreover, nations holding Iraqi debt will be much less willing to forgive its massive debt 
obligations until long-term stability is achieved. As the Chadian model suggests, some 
exogenous oversight is strongly suggested to ensure the government is responsive to the 
publics’ and foreign investors’ needs for transparency, anti-corruption, and accountability 
measures. 
1. Limitations of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 
(EITI) 
The EITI provides a general framework within which a nation may seek to 
legitimize its efforts toward these important considerations, but it is not without its 
detractors. One critique of EITI also happens to be one of its strengths--that it is primarily 
managed from outside, rather than from inside the country. It is obvious that exogenous 
oversight would be extremely useful for nations at risk of failure in the short-term. 
However, it could prove extremely detrimental to the long-term ability of a nation to 
provide for its own accountability and transparency if it does not learn from the 
experience. This would be especially true for nations who delegate these responsibilities 
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without making significant investments in both human capital and knowledge 
management relating to anti-corruption and efficiency. Moreover, while an international 
body such as the EITI may have a nation’s best interests at heart, it would likely often be 
at odds with the host nation’s government due to conflicting priorities and agendas. As 
appears to be happening in Chad, resentment may build over time as the international 
body calls into question decisions made by the host nation. 
It is also important to note here that the International Compact with Iraq, or ICI, is 
a completely voluntary arrangement and is thus subject to the continued cooperation of 
the host-nation. While international pressure, and even outright sanctions, may have 
varying levels of success with a nation in non-compliance, there are limits to what the 
international community can actually do to force a nation back into compliance. This 
phenomenon is seen in the Chadian model wherein the World Bank and International 
Monetary Fund had to suspend the contracting right of Chad and attempted to freeze its 
assets due to continued failure to meet minimum, mandatory accountability requirements. 
It can be argued that, in cases like this, the people suffer while the regime in power is 
relatively unaffected, especially in the short term. Finally, due to the international nature 
of exogenous oversight, external mandates might not be perceived as legitimate by the 
host nation’s people. These problems, if left unchecked, could reduce incentives for 
stability and reconstruction, thereby threatening the program’s ability to contribute 
significantly to resolving the principal-agent problem. 
2. Limitations of the International Compact with Iraq (ICT) Model 
The ICT model that promotes electronic means to register citizens and 
subsequently manages their payments into and out of the system is an attractive idea 
(Bond, 2007). This approach would also provide opportunities to guard against corrupt 
government officials, and against those who do not have the best interests of Iraq in mind 
(e.g., foreign fighters or terrorists). 
While a program like the ICT offers great potential value it would require 
significant infrastructure investments and education to implement. It would also likely 
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require a massive commitment from the U.S., international organizations, and virtually 
all stakeholders in the process. Although similar technology does exist and has been used 
in the past--mobile Automated Teller Machine (ATM) technology, complete with 
fingerprint verification systems, have been used in South Africa since the end of 
apartheid--it would likely require considerable modification. (Goodman, 1994) 
In South Africa, national wealth distribution checks had previously been sent to 
distribution centers in the countryside, requiring recipients to walk long distances to 
receive them. Many recipients were so inexperienced with these types of transactions that 
they were shortchanged when they cashed their checks, or were subject to any number of 
other fraudulent activities. First National Bank used mobile ATMs to bring money closer 
to their homes, directly to recipients, and verified the recipient’s identity through the 
biometric fingerprint reader built into the ATM. This greatly reduced fraud and increased 
efficiency by ensuring the right amounts were provided to the right people. It is likely 
that technology of this sort could be converted for use in Iraq. (Goodman, 1994) 
B.  PRIVATIZATION 
By moving away from a per-capita, regional revenue distribution system, to a 
one-citizen, one-share model, the incentives for power struggles and disenfranchisement 
are greatly reduced. This is due to the fact that revenues would no longer be solely 
distributed to the provincial governments who could choose to do with the revenue what 
they liked, including not distributing it to the people. The privatization of Eastern Bloc 
countries revealed that, by issuing shares in a previously publicly-held resource, a great 
value-adding mechanism is created for the country, the government, and the people. The 
people benefit from a psychological sense of satisfaction from owning a part of the 
country’s resources. Personal wealth is created through dividends from the stock that is 
held. The ability to consolidate shares results in large shareholder interests with an 
incentive to protect the factors of production and demand an efficient, transparent 
government.  
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Privatizing the Iraqi National Oil Company would allow private ownership and 
stock distribution in that company, which owns all the factors of production and supply 
equipment in the country under the draft oil law (see Figure 6). Citizens of Iraq, who 
participate in a process of registration (the ICT provides one representative model) and 
gain standing through verified citizenship and good behavior, could then either hold their 
shares of this important, valuable national resource, or sell them in a free market. As seen 
with the Alaska Permanent Fund (APF) model, revenue flows create citizen-stakeholders 
who have an incentive to be involved in the political process. These stakeholders, in turn, 
favor stability and tend to support more transparent and representative governance. 
In the case of Iraq, the premium on security and stability suggests a vesting 
process be used for share ownership so people stay focused on the benefits of national 
integrity, efficient and effective oil development, and stability and security. For example, 
Iraqis might be allowed to sell only 20% of their shares per year, over 5 years. This 
would solve some of the problems that could be created by those who would sell all their 
shares immediately and then become disenfranchised. It would also fight against sellers’ 
remorse if the value of those shares increased dramatically after security, stability and 
economic prosperity took hold in Iraq.  
C.  FUND LONGEVITY 
This project found the APF model particularly appealing in that the principal of 
the oil revenue fund is protected. Only the interest in the APF is paid out to the citizens, 
thereby protecting the resources from short-sighted government exploitation. By pursuing 
investments in Alaska, the U.S., and even globally, the APF has been able to transform 
non-renewable oil resources into a renewable financial resource for citizens that will have 
a life well beyond the lifetime of the oil. 
D.  OTHER CONSTRAINTS AND IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES 
Other issues will also have to be dealt with by policy makers. One such issue 
involves inter-generational transfers and family size. If one family has five members and 
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another has ten, will the one-person, one-share model create economic distortions, serve 
as a source of discontent, or create unintended consequences? Moreover, should shares be 
allowed to be willed to surviving family members upon their death? If so, does this not 
also create a fairness issue for smaller families, or for families who are unable to have 
children? These questions are a few examples of issues that must be addressed prior to 
implementing an Iraqi oil revenue distribution fund. 
Also, it should be clearly understood that any program expected to make a 
difference in the lives of average Iraqi citizens would need to be marketed appropriately. 
An education effort directed at the Iraqi people would need to focus on: the value of their 
shares and the distribution process; the vesting process; the benefits to individuals of 
protecting oil infrastructure from attack; and the connection between the reduction in 
violence and debt forgiveness and future economic development. One marketing slogan 
could be, “It’s your Oil. Protect it, invest it wisely, and give your family the future it 
deserves.” 
Finally, the central government today controls and distributes oil receipts and 
maintains the country’s extensive system of subsidies for food, fuel, electricity, other 
utilities, and pensions. Until the public distribution system is dismantled, it will continue 
to distort the Iraqi economy through price controls and discourage those who are seeking 
work. One possible way forward would be to gradually phase out subsidy payments and 
price controls as shares are distributed and dividend payments issued. 
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X. CONCLUSION 
This project began with a review of the literature that provides important 
background information on key issues that face Iraq. Next, an examination and analysis 
was provided of current challenges confronting the government of Iraq. It was followed 
by a basic description of the principal-agent problem, especially as it concerns the nation 
of Iraq. Then the project examined alternative methods of distributing a nation’s natural 
resource wealth to its population. The privatization experiences of both Czechoslovakia 
and Poland were briefly described. These examples presented two alternative approaches 
that could be useful if Iraq decided to undertake similar measures. Along with a 
discussion of Alaska’s Permanent Fund model, and the experiences of Norway and Chad, 
a description of the fundamental components of these alternative wealth distribution 
models served as the basis for a qualitative benefit-cost analysis. Several criteria were 
formulated to evaluate the proposed alternatives. These criteria were an outgrowth of 
three main questions asked of each alternative distribution model. First, how efficiently 
and equitably would the model distribute oil ownership to the Iraqi people? Second, how 
effective is it likely to be in encouraging individuals to support increased security and 
stability? Finally, how effective is it likely to be in contributing to future economic 
development? The results of the benefit-cost analysis were used to evaluate alternative oil 
distribution proposals and to support several policy recommendations. One of the most 
important policy considerations that resulted from this analysis was that the current Iraqi 
draft oil law is not likely to solve the principal-agent problem in Iraq, but could instead 
compound the problem. The recommendations made here are vital to ensuring the Iraqi 
people will benefit from a stable and secure society by giving them a personal stake in the 
successful development of their economy.  
This project had one primary goal: to explore the benefits and costs of alternative 
approaches that would provide private Iraqi ownership of that nation’s oil wealth. The 
study had two underlying hypotheses. First, through private ownership, individual Iraqis 
will have an incentive to preserve the value of their shares, resulting in a strong financial 
interest supporting their demand for security. Second, by allowing every Iraqi the ability 
 104
to sell some or all of their shares, and/or to receive dividends from an oil fund, financing 
will be made available for entrepreneurial efforts. Given an adequate macroeconomic and 
institutional environment, this could have the effect of stimulating the Iraqi economy 
unleashing the entrepreneurial spirit of the Iraqi people, boosting economic development, 
and creating even greater demand for stability by individual Iraqi citizens. Finally, by 
allowing the sale and accumulation of shares, powerful ownership interests are likely to 
arise that will insist on the protection and efficient management and operation of Iraq’s 
oil infrastructure. 
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